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Occupational Hazards
Life is largely a matter of expectation.
Horace
Amir Paz-Fuchs and Yaël Ronen*
I.
INTRODUCTION
In July 2011, another small episode was written into the history of the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank. For the first time in forty-four years of
occupation, Palestinian workers engaged in a collective dispute with their Israeli
employer. Forty Palestinian workers in the Sal'it quarry, located in the West
Bank east of Jerusalem, went on strike, demanding that the management,
comprised of Jewish Israelis, guarantee them fair employment conditions
(including pensions), refrain from arbitrary dismissals, and sign a collective
agreement entrenching these terms. This event came in the wake of recent
important and interesting legal developments, which have contributed to the
shaping of economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians, individually
and collectively. These developments, which have received relatively little
attention from legal commentators, merit documentation and analysis. This
Article aims to fill this gap in legal research with respect to the discrete area of
labor law. In particular, it examines the law applicable to the employment of
Palestinian West Bank residents in Israeli West Bank settlements, as developed
by judgments of the Israeli National Labor Court and High Court of Justice.
Since 1967 and for the first two decades of Israel's occupation of the West
Bank and the Gaza strip, the Palestinian workforce has relied in an incremental
fashion on work in Israel and for Israelis in the occupied territories.' From
* Dr. Amir Paz-Fuchs is a senior lecturer at Ono Academic College. Dr. Yaël Ronen is a senior
lecturer at Sha'arei Mishpat College. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the workshop
on Precarious Workers held by the Minerva Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University
(April 2011) and at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference, held at the University of Cambridge
(September 2011). We are grateful for the thoughtñil comments of the participants in the workshop
as well to those of Guy Harpaz, Michael Karayanni, David Kretzmer, Virginia Montavlou, and
Yuval Shany. The usual caveats apply.
1. For an account and analysis of Palestinian employment in Israel up to the end of the late
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11.8% of the workforce (which was 173,300 in total) in 1971, the share of
Palestinians employed in Israel rose to 39.2% (of 277,700 in total) by 1987. The
employment of almost 40% of the workforce outside the local market has no
parallel in the world.^ Taking into account uru^egistered workers, some estimate
that the figure is closer to 70%.^
Since the first intifada in 1987, and even more significantly since the
eruption of the second intifada in 2000, the number of Palestinians granted entry
permits to Israel has fallen dramatically, to a little over 10% (28,000)."'
Unemployment and poverty in the occupied territories has soared to over 50%,
and those who were able searched for work in the settlements and in the Israeli-
owned industries. An aggregation of available data suggests that the number of
Palestinians lawfully employed by Israeli municipal councils and private
enterprises in the West Bank (not including East Jemsalem) in agriculture,
industry, construction and services is over 50,000.^ The Civil Administration
assessed that a further 15,000 Palestinians were employed unlawfully (without
permits).^
The terms of employment of Palestinians in the Israeli settlements, and
more specifically the law goveming them, were challenged in regional labor
courts in the late 1990s, when Palestinian employees of several public and
private Israeli employers submitted claims against their employers, demanding
certain employment rights and benefits in accordance with Israeli law.^ The
1990s .see Guy Mundlak, Power Breaking or Power Entrenching Law: The Regulation of Palestinian
Workers in Israel. 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 569 (1999).
2. NEVE GORDON, ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION 81 (2008).
3. YBHEZicEL LEIN, BUILDERS OF ZioN 8 (1999).
4. ISRAELI KNESSET, GOVERNMENT POLICY PAPER ON FOREIGN WORKERS 5 (2010) (in
Hebrew).
5. According to an Israeli Govemment policy paper, 25,000 Palestinians are employed in
Israel. 5ee id. By the end of 2010, Palestinians were being employed in Israel, settlements, and in
industrial zones in the West Bank. See UNRWA, The West Bank Labour Market in 2008: A Briefing
Paper 2009, UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY, 8 Table 2 (2009),
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/201001196450.pdf [hereinafter UNRWA].
6. GiLAD NATAN, PALESTINIAN WORKERS IN THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN JUDEA AND
SAMARIA I (2007).
7. Israeli courts, including labor courts, acquire jurisdiction upon service of documents to the
defendant. According to the Rules of Proeedure documents may be served in the oecupied territories
as if they were served in Israel. See Rules of Procedure (Service of Documents in the Administered
Territories), 5729-1969 KT 2482, 458, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). Under the
instructions of the Military Advocate General (and later Attorney General of Israel and President of
the Supreme Court) Meir Shamgar, the State has never relied on the plea of a lack of locus standi
with respect to alien residents of territory not under Israeli sovereignty. Meir Shamgar, Legal
Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government - The Initial Stage, in MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 31,
43 n.56 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982) [hereinafter MILITARY GOVERNMENT]. For an intemational legal
analysis of the Supreme Court's competence to review military enaetments, see Eli Nathan, The
Power of Supervision by the High Court of Justice over Military Government, in MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 109
(Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
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principal question examined by the regional labor courts was whether the labor
relations in question were govemed by Israeli law or by the territorial law of the
West Bank, which is based on Jordanian law. The regional labor courts
determined that the employment relations in question were govemed by Israeli
law. The employers appealed to the National Labor Court (NLC), which
reversed the regional couris' judgments.* While the NLC ruled that the labor
relations between Palestinians and their Israeli employers in the settlements
were govemed by Jordanian law, it acknowledged that considerations of public
policy and non-discrimination might require the application of certain rights
guaranteed under Israeli law to Palestinian employees, on a case-by-case basis.
The NLC remanded the cases back to the regional couris to be decided on their
individual merits. An Israeli NGO, Worker's Hotline, submitted a petition to the
Supreme Coiui sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ) against the NLC
judgment.^ The HCJ reversed the NLC's judgment, and mied that the
employment confracts of the Palestinian employees are in fact governed by
Israeli law.'"
The different analyses made by the NLC and the HCJ highlight the
intersection of different areas of law: choice of law, public intemational law (in
particular the law of occupation), and labor law. This intersection raises
interesting tensions for two main reasons: First, public intemational law
maintains sovereignty and territory as its central tenants, yet this centrality is
undermined, insofar as labor law is concemed," by the growing mobilify of
labor and capital that renders national boundaries somewhat less relevant.
Second, while public international law regulates occupation of territory, the
exceptional duration of Israel's occupation of the West Bank (and perhaps the
Gaza strip) has led to an economic entanglement between Israel and the
territories in a manner not predicted by the framers of the intemational legal
stmcture, nor adequately addressed by the law of occupation. We argue that the
analyses by the courts of the choice of law question, while ostensibly informed
by the fact that it arose in the context of a labor conflict, did not take into
account of the imporiance of labor law. In addition, we highlight the public
intemational legal implications of the rulings.
8. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 Givat Ze'ev v. Mahmoud 38 Ubor Judgments 577 [2003]
(Isr.). In Israel, labor eases are adjudieated, in the first instance, in regional labor courts. Appeals are
reviewed by the National Labor Court (NLC). In exceptional cases, NLC deeisions may be reviewed
following a petition to the High Court of Justice (HCJ).
9. HCJ 5666/03 Worker's Hotline v. Nat'l Ubor Ct. (Oct. 10, 2007), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription) (Isr.).
10. Id.atX.
11. William B. Gould, The Rights of Wage Eamers: Of Human Rights and International
Labor Standards, 3 INDUS. RELATIONS L.J. 489 (1979); Guy Mundlak, De-Territorializing Labor
Law, 3 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 189 (2009); Brian Ungille, Core Labor Rights - The True Story, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 409 (2005); Philip Alston, 'Core Labor Standards' and the Transformation of
International Labour Law, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457 (2004); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor
Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007).
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While the challenges explored here are intimately linked to the
phenomenon of occupation, the increased swiftness with which private
companies worldwide are able to cross borders and set up enterprises outside of
their state of origin makes the following analysis highly relevant to businesses
worldwide. Thus, a 2003 report prepared for the Intemational Labor Movement
profiles sixteen of the most prominent corporations operating in Iraq in a wide
variety of service arenas.'^ These include energy (e.g., Halliburton and KBR),
construction (e.g., Bechtel Group, Stevedoring Services of America, Black and
Veatch, Louis Berger, and Parsons), telecommunications (e.g., MCI Worldcom),
consulting (e.g. ABT and CAI), and more.'^ All the companies in the report
already have experience in "transitional" and "post-war" crisis countries, and all
have employed a low standard of labor relations with respect, inter alia, to
unions and health and safety requirements.''*
Part II of this Article provides a brief factual background. It describes the
sources of labor law applicable in the West Bank, as well as the origins of, and
judgment in, the Worker's Hotline case, which addressed the law applicable to
the employment of Palestinians in the settlements. Part II concludes by
explaining how employers have contravened the judgment's raison d'être by
constructing employment arrangements that effectively circumvent the holding
while staying loyal to its letter. We argue that such sttategies are possible in part
because of the HCJ's incorrect framing of the issue in the case. Part III
addresses the law applicable to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, both generally
and specifically with respect to labor law. It deals with a surprisingly common
error conceming the legal basis that enables Israeli settlers to live in accordance
with Israeli rather than Jordanian law. The understanding of the legal
mechanisms applicable to Palestinian and to Israeli employees forms the basis
for Part IV, which examines the actual significance of equality between
employees, a principle extolled by the HCJ as a fundamental, for Palestinians
working in the settlements. We argue that rather than pursuing equality in the
applicable legal system, the HCJ should have pursued equality in the terms and
conditions of work. We begin by considering the significance of each of these
perceptions of equality. We argue that considerations of labor law and public
intemational law militate against the blind pursuit of equality in the applicable
legal system with respect to long-term occupation butfressed by forceful
economic intervention. In this context, pursuing equality in the legal system
risks obscuring an injustice both to individual interests and to collective ones,
such as protection from annexation. We then explain the preference for pursuing
equality as relating to conditions of work, and propose means by which this goal
can be achieved. We conclude Part IV by indicating the economic reality that is
12. U.S. LABOR AGAINST THE WAR, PROFILE OF U.S. CORPORATIONS AWARDED CONTRACTS
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obscured by trite reference to equality, and caution that equality, an ostensibly
laudable means of protecting a weak population, may be counterproductive if it
is practiced as an abstract principle detached from the particular factual and
legal context in which it is sought.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Labor Law in the West Bank
In the wake of the 1967 War, the territories occupied during the war,
among them the West Bank, were placed under the administration of a military
govemment, run by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Immediately upon its
establishment, the military govemment proclaimed the law applicable in the
West Bank, providing, inter alia:
2. The law which existed iti the Region on June 7, 1967, shall remain in force,
insofar as it does not in any way conflict with the provisions of this Proclamation
or any other Proclamation or any Proclamation or Order which may be issued by
me [i.e. the military commander], and subject to modifications resulting from the
establishment of govemment by the Israeli Defense Force in the Region.
3(a). All powers of govemment, legislation, appointment and administration in
relation to the region and its inhabitants shall henceforth vest in me alone and
shall be exercised by me or by such person appointed by me or to act on my
behalf'5
This proclamation was in line with the requirements of Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations, which stipulate that the occupant "shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."'^
In consequence of the Proclamation and in line with the law of occupation,
the prevailing local law in the West Bank (i.e., Jordanian law) remains in force
unless amended or repealed by the enactments of the military govemment. The
relationship between military enactments and local law was defined in a military
enactment, which provided that "each security enactment has preference over
any local law, even if it has not explicitly repealed the latter."'^
15. Proclamation Regarding Govemment and Law Arrangements (West Bank Region), 5727-
1967, SH No. 2 (Isr.)
16. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex
(Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907), Oct. 19, 1907, 2227 T.S.
No. 53 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)]; see also Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention (IV)].
17. Interpretation Order (West Bank Region), 5727-1967, No. 130, Sect. 8(a) (1967). This
provision is redundant from an intemational legal perspective, since military enactments by
definition override conflicting local law. A separate question, outside the scope of the present article.
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In one of the early cases dealing with the legislative competence of the
military government under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the HCJ ruled
that the words "unless absolutely prevented" must be interpreted as referring not
only to the military needs of the occupying army but also as imposing on the
military government a duty to safeguard the economic and social interests of the
population.'^ Subsequently, the subject matter of Israeli military enactments has
greatly expanded beyond narrow military exigencies and the safety of Israeli
forces.'^ Since 1967, military commanders have issued over 2,500 military
enactments, in topics ranging from military, judiciary, and fiscal affairs, through
welfare, health, and education, to import duties, postal laws, and the
transportation of agricultural products.^ "^ Many military enactments regulating
non-military affairs open with a declaration that they are "required for the
benefit of the local population."^' Among these military enactments, only a few
(considered below) concern labor law.
The 1990s peace process made no change to the labor law regime in the
West Bank. The 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO on self-
government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip transferred powers and
responsibilities in the labor sphere to the Palestinian Authority, including
regulation of, "inter alia, rights of workers, labor relations, labor conciliation,
safety and hygiene in work places, labor accidents and compensation, vocational
is the legal validity of a military enactment that does not respect the law in force even though the
military commander is not 'absolutely prevented' from such respect.
18. HCJ 337/71 Almakdassa v. Minister of Defense 26(1) PD 574,1| 9 [1972] (lsr.) (authors'
translation). This case concerned a military enactment amending the Jordanian Labor Law in order
to enable the Military Commander to appoint members of an arbitration council for the resolution of
labor disputes. The pre-existing Jordanian labor law required that the council be composed of
representatives of employee organizations, but no such organizations existed. The HCJ confirmed
the validity of the order in light of the military commander's authority to address the needs of the
population. But see id. (Cohen, J. dissenting) (arguing that the occupant's duty is not to take up
improvements which the former government failed to implement, at least not unless the resulting
situation was intolerable). This minor labor dispute between a Palestinian employer and a Palestinian
employee was the first time that the Israeli HCJ decided (implicitly, and without discussion) that it
has jurisdiction to rule on issues taking place in the occupied territories. See Michael Sfard, The
Human Rights Lawyer's Existential Dilemma, 38 ISR. L. REV. 154, 157 (2005). The Court did not
consider Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which increases the power—and the
responsibility—of the occupying power. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OCCUPATION 100-05 (1993) (reprint 2004).
19. All military enactments hold the same formal normative level. However, they are titled in
a hierarchical fashion. Thus, there are "proclamations" and "orders" which are regarded as primary
legislation, "regulations" Ihat are secondary legislation, and notices that are of a lower order. In
practice, there is a hierarchical significance to these designations. If a regulation conflicts with the
authorizing "order," the order will prevail. In addition, the authority to issue regulations has been at
time delegated to various officials in the military government, while the authority to issue orders
remains with the Military Commander.
20. GORDON, supra note 2, at 27.
21. See, e.g.. Insurance of Motor Vehicles Order (Third Party Risk) (Temporary Provision)
(West Bank Region), 5727-1967, No. 55 (Jordan); Order Regarding Using Pesticide on Olive Trees
Against Olive Flies (Judea and Samaria), 5736-1975, No. 645 (Jordan).
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and professional fraining courses, cooperative associations, professional work
associations and frade unions, [and] heavy machinery equipment."^^ However,
the Interim Agreement excludes Israeli settlements from the scope of its
provisions. Thus, the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian
Authority does not extend in any way to the settlements.^-' In short, labor law in
the West Bank remains regulated largely by Jordanian law.
When Israeli forces entered the West Bank in 1967, the Jordanian Labor
Law of 1960 (as amended in 1965)^ '* was in force in the region. In 1972, Justice
Cohen noted that the Jordanian Labor Law Code "is an excellent and modern
law, which merits that its authority and splendor be retained."^^ Perhaps for this
reason, Israeli courts, which have generally demonstrated a preference for Israeli
law in almost all private transactions between Israelis and Palestinian residents
of the territories, exceptionally freated labor confracts between Israeli employers
and Palestinian employees as governed by the local law of the territories, rather
than by Israeli law.^^
Through the years Jordanian labor law has been amended through military
enactments with respect to work accidents,^^ sick pay,^^ compensation claims,
and certain administrative issues.^^ Particularly noteworthy are the 1982 Order
on Employment of Workers in Certain Places (Judea and Samaria) and its 2007
amendment. The 1982 order duplicated Israel's Minimum Wage Law to work
for Israeli employers within the settlements.^ *^ The 2007 amendment extended
the obligation to pay minimum wage to Israeli employers of Palestinian
employees anywhere within the West Bank.-"
Consistent with Justice Cohen's appreciation, some labor rights under
22. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, lsr.-Pales.,
annex III, appendix I, art. 21 Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 557 [hereinafter Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement].
23. W. atart. XVll(l).
24. Labor Law (Judea and Samria), 5720-1960, No. 21, amended by Labor Law (Judea and
Samaria), 5725-1965, No. 2 (Jordan) (and subsequent amendments).
25. Almakadssa, HCJ 337/71, 26(1) PD at 586 (Cohen, J. dissenting (but not on this point)).
26. BBNVENISTI, supra note 18, at 134.
27. See, e.g., Order Regarding Work Accident Insurance (Judea and Samaria), 5736-1976, No.
662 (Jordan); Order Regarding the Labor Law (Work Accidents) (Judea and Samaria), 5736-1976,
No. 663 (Jordan); Labor Law (Judea and Samaria), 5720-1960, No. 21, amended by Labor Law
(Judea and Samaria), 5725-1965, No. 2 (Jordan) (and subsequent amendments).
28. See Order Amending the Jordanian Labor Law No. 21 of 1960 (Amendment No. 6) (Judea
and Samaria), 5745-1985, No. 1133 (Jordan).
29. See Order Amending the Jordanian Labor Law No. 21 of 1960 (Judea and Samaria), 5731 -
1971, No. 439 (Jordan); Order Amending the Jordanian Labor Law, Law No. 21 of 1960
(Amendment) (Judea and Samaria) 5740-1980, No. 825 (Jordan).
30. Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations (Judsa and Samaria),
5742-1982, No. 967, art. 3 (Jordan) [Hereinafter Order No. 967].
31. Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations (Amendment No. 3)
(Judea and Samaria) (No. 1605) 5788-2007. Nov. 7, 2007, article 6, adding Article 3B to Order No.
967 [hereinafter Order No. 1605].
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Jordanian law, as enacted over fifry years ago and modified by the military
commander, are comparable to those guaranteed under Israeli law in the early
twenty-first century. The Attomey General, in a brief submitted to the NLC,
listed similarities between the two legal regimes with respect to matters falling
within the rubrics of maximum daily and weekly hour limit, minimum wage,
sick pay, annual leave, protection of minors and women, severance pay, accident
compensation, labor administration, and settlement of disputes. While in most
instances Israeli law is more generous, in some contexts Jordanian law is more
beneficial, such as sick pay.^^
It should be noted, however, that the list submitted by the Attomey General
is selective. It does not address various areas of labor law that are regulated
under Israeli law but not under Jordanian law, including collective rights, such
as the right to form unions, protection of unions and the right to strike—all of
which are highly relevant to Palestinian employees' rights. While collective
rights and collective agreements have governed the employment relations of the
majorify of employees in the Israeli labor force since soon after the
establishment of the state in 1948,-^ ^ no unions existed in the West Bank at that
time.-'"' Additionally, Jordanian law does not address, inter alia, leave to care for
a sick family member, pay in lieu of annual leave, delay in payment of wages or
of severance pay, equality at work, protection of employment for a pregnant
employee, and protection against sexual harassment. Furthermore, rights
enumerated under both regimes may have the same headings (e.g. working
hours) but contain very different subsets (application, exemptions, sanctions,
etc.), leading to a significant disparity between the two legal systems.-'^
A further complication arises with respect to apparently identical
provisions that differ in implementation. For example, minimum wage in Israel
is paid on either an hourly or monthly basis, while in the occupied territories,
Palestinians' minimum wage is always paid on an hourly basis.-'^ The latter
implementation exempts employers from paying for time during which work is
suspended even though the employees remain at their disposal (e.g., when
32. See Givat Ze'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 16 (citing Attomey General's Brief
(undated) (on file with the authors)).
33. GUY MUNDLAK, FADING CORPORATISM 62 (2008).
34. See Almakdassa, HCJ 337/71, 26(1) PD 574 (the military commander was ordered to staff
the arbitration council, which was supposed to composed of labor and employer unions, that had
been inoperative under Jordanian mle, inter alia, beeause no such unions existed at the time). But see
HCJ 507/85 Tamimi v. Minister of Defense 41(4) PD 57 [1987] (Isr.) (mling that the military
commander had to make the necessary arrangements for the establishment of a lawyers' union, even
though no such union existed under Jordanian mle).
35. E.g., under the heading of "Annual Leave," Israeli law allows cashing-in of annual leave
pay if work terminates prior to the leave, while Jordanian law does not make a similar provision,
even under the same heading. Brief of the Attomey General, supra note 32, at Appendix B.
36. Minutes of the Knesset Standing Committee for the Assessment of the Problem of Migrant
Workers (July 3, 2007), at 15 (in Hebrew).
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machinery breaks down).-'^ Moreover, the formula for calculating minimum
wage (extended in the occupied territories to all employees of Israelis) is the
minimum monthly wage divided by the number of monthly working hours—186
under Israeli law, and 200 under Jordanian law.^^ This produces a significantly
lower figure for a minimum hourly wage in the West Bank, despite the identical
provisions under Israeli law and under the military enactment amending
Jordanian law.
B. The Litigation: Worker's Hotline
The origin of the Worker's Hotline case lies in five judgments of regional
labor courts, which applied Israeli law to the labor relations between Palestinian
residents of the West Bank and their Israeli employers in the settlements. In
Giv 'at Ze 'ev^^ the Jemsalem regional labor court ruled in favor of fourteen
Palestinian cleaners, employed by the municipal council of Giv'at Ze'ev, who
claimed minimum wage, pension, travel expenses, convalescence pay, holiday
pay, severance pay, advance notice, and wage incentives, all under Israeli law.
In Abir Ltd., a Palestinian day employee of Abir Textile Industries Ltd., an
Israeli firm located in the Barkan industrial zone, claimed advance notice,
severance pay, compensation for delay in wages, pay in lieu of annual leave and
minimum wage, all under Israeli law. The Tel-Aviv regional labor court mied in
favor of the employee and Abir filed an appeal of this decision.^*' In a similar
case. Aqua Print Ltd., a Palestinian working for Aqua Print Ltd., an Israeli
company located in the Ma'ale Efraim indusfrial zone, demanded similar
benefits after being dismissed. Again, the Tel-Aviv regional labor court mied in
his favor.'" In Tzarfati Car Services Ltd., a Palestinian employed by an Israeli
garage located in the Ma'ale Adumim industrial zone, demanded severance pay
and social benefits under Israeli law. The Jemsalem regional labor court rejected
the employer's claim that Israeli labor law did not apply.'^ ^ Lastly, in Nituv
Management and Development Ltd. the Tel-Aviv labor court denied a request
for summary dismissal filed by the respondent company, which was based on
the claim that the Israeli Severance Compensation Act (1963) did not apply to a
Palestinian employee.''^
37. See HUGH COLLINS, KEITH D. EWING & AlLEEN MCCOLGAN, LABOUR LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 378-79,460 (2001 ).
38. Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations (Judea and Samaria),
5742-1982, No. 967, art. 3 (Jordan); Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations
(Amendment 3) (Judea and Samaria), 5788-2007, No. 1605 (Jordan) (amending No. 967).
39. Labor Ct. 55/3-100 to 55/3-113 Giv'at Ze'ev (1997), Nevo Leg^l Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
40. Labor Ct. 57/3-2981 Abir Ltd. (1997), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
41. Labor Ct. 300309/99 Aqua Print Ltd. (2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
42. Labor Ct. 1097/99 Tzarfati Car Services (Sept. II, 2000), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
43. Labor Ct. 35/3400 Nituv Mgmt. and Dev. (1998), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
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Even this cursory overview reveals several important commonalities among
the cases. First, they all involve Palestinian employees and Israeli employers.
Second, the employees demanded minimum rights according to Israel statutory
labor law. No claim was made regarding benefits arising from applicable
collective agreements. Third, all the claims were accepted by regional courts.
Amidst these commonalities, it should be noted that while four of the
employers' appeals to the NLC involved Israeli companies from the private
sector, situated in the West Bank, one appeal (Giv'at Ze'ev) involved a public
sector employer (a municipality).
The employers in the five cases appealed to the NLC. The NLC chose to
deal jointly with the substantive legal question that all the cases have in
common: does Israeli labor law apply to the employment of Palestinians within
a settlement in the West Bank by an Israeli corporation or public employer?'*''
Under the Israeli choice of law doctrine, which draws on the common law,
the law goveming a eonfract is primarily that which the parties have chosen.
Thus, an express stipulation on the matter will usually be given effect by the
court. If the parties have not chosen a law, the court must identify the law to
which the contract is most closely connected.''^
The NLC noted that in none of the cases were there written contacts or
express stipulations of the applicable law."*^  It therefore followed the traditional,
contact-based approach in order to identify the law to which the confracts were
most closely connected, reversing the regional labor courts' judgments. The
NLC started with the presumption that the contract is govemed first and
foremost by the law of the place of performance,^^ and then examined whether
there was a country other than Jordan to which the eonfract was more closely
connected under a weighted contact count, namely one which attaches different
weight to various contacts.''^ The Court drew on the 1980 Rome Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the "Rome Convention"),''^ and
specifically Article 6(2) goveming "Individual Employment Confracts." Article
6(2)(a) provides:
(a) . . . a contract of employment shall, in the absence of choice [by the parties],
be govemed by the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries
(Isr.).
44. Givat Ze 'ev. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98.
45. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1114 (quoting CA 419/71 Menora Liability and
Secondary Insurance Co. Ltd v. Nomikos 26(2) PD 527, 531 [1972] (Isr.)). See also Council
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 80/934, art. 4(1), 1980 O.J. (L266) 1.
[herinafter Rome Convention]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §88 (1971 ).
46. Givat Ze 'ev. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 21.
47. See Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 14; Menora, CA 419/71, 26(2) PD at 531 ; Rome
Convention, supra note 45, at arts. 4(1), 6(2); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
supra note 45, § 188(2)(c).
48. Givat Ze 'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 24.
49. See Rome Convention, supra note 45, at art. 4( 1 ); Consolidated Version of the Convention
on the L^w Applicable to Conti-actual Obligations, Jan. 6, 1998, 1998 O.J. (C027) 34.
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out his work in performance of the contract . . . unless it appears from the
circumstatiees as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another
country, in which case the contract shall be governed by the law of that
country. ^ *^
The NLC noted that the specific contacts to Israeli law were the identity of
the employer, the currency of payment, the language of documents, the
adherence to Israeli days of rest, and even the payment of tax in Israel. None of
these, the court found, were indicative of the applicable law.^' In contrast, the
contacts to Jordanian law included the facts that the contracts were performed in
the West Bank, which was also the place of contracting; the place of business of
the employer was the West Bank;^^ and the employees were Palestinian
residents of the West Bank.^-' On this basis, the NLC concluded that the
contracts were more closely connected to Jordanian law.^ '* It then added that
public policy considerations may require completion of "gaps" in a contract
governed by foreign law, with "certain Israeli rules that reflect universal norms
applied by civilized nations acting under international standards to provide
employees with reasonable protection."^^ These rules would include the right to
weekly rest, minimum pay, gender equality, and more.^^
Among the factors determining whether such completion was required as a
matter of public policy, the Court pointed out that, in practice, Israeli and
Jordanian law are very similar.^^ The NLC noted that not only have Israeli labor
norms been incorporated into the law of the territory,^^ but that under normal
conditions, Palestinian residents of the West Bank work both in Israel and in the
West Bank for both public and private Israeli employers. Accordingly, the NLC
found that there was "no justification for significant differences between the two
systems,"^^ implying that there was no public policy consideration that justified
the substitution of Jordanian law with Israeli law.^^ The Court's consideration of
50. Rome Convention, supra note 45, at arts. 6(2).
51. Givat Ze 'ev. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 29.
52. A eontact that largely duplicates the former.
53. Givat Ze 'ev. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 30.
54. W. at II 31.
55. W. at II 35.
56. Id.
57. W. at1|36(d).
58. The Court did not clarify which norms or how they had been incorpóratela in the law of the
West Bank, but may have been referring to Order No. 967 and Order No. 1605, which apply Israeli
minimum wage in the settlements and to Israeli employers throughout the West Bank. See Order
Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations (Amendment 3) (Jucea and Samaria),
5788-2007, No. 1605 (Jordan); Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations
(Amendment 3) (Judea and Samaria), 5788-2007, No. 1605 (Jordan) (adding art. 3B to Order No.
967).
59. Givat Ze 'ev. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at \ 36(g). It is not clear whether the Court made
a normative or a factual finding.
60. One might note that the notion of using of public policy not to reject the application of
foreign law but to apply the law of the forum is exceptional.
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the characteristics of the labor market^' drew upon public interests, namely the
needs of the economic organization of both Israel and the West Bank. The Court
then noted that since Israelis are employed in the settlements under Israeli law,
prima facie different terms of employment for Israelis and Palestinians would be
discriminatory and prohibited. This prohibition would stem either from
administrative legal principles (applicable to public employers) or from the
obligation of good faith, which entails equal treatment of employees (applicable
also to private employers). In any case, any claim of discrimination, like the
question of public policy, should be determined by the lower courts. ^ ^
The NLC's analysis is a straightforward but inaccurate application of the
European approach reflected in the Rome Convention. For one, the NLC
examined each of the contacts separately, rather than together under a weighted
count. Correctly pointing out that none of the contacts (e.g., the identity of the
employer, the currency used, the language of documents, and even the
incorporation of the provision of Israeli law regarding days of rest on Jewish
holidays) would alone establish that a contract is more closely connected to
Israel, the Court failed to take into account the cumulative effect of the
numerous contacts, which may lead to a different conclusion. Furthermore,
when examining the individual contacts, the Court merely noted that none of
them indicated that Israeli law govemed the contract. That, however, is not the
question. The question is whether these contacts (together, or according to the
Court, individually) create a strong enough connection to Israel to rebut the
presumption that the law of the place of performance govems the contract. The
NLC's failure to consider the cumulative effect of the numerous contacts to
Israeli law, combined with its rejection of weighing each contact, could indicate
that the only circumstance in which the presumption would have been rebutted
is if the parties had expressly stipulated the applicable law. In that case, the
entire interpretative exercise would not have been necessary.^^
The NLC noted that the presumption that the confract is govemed by the
law of the place of performance aims, inter alia, to protect migrant employees
from exploitation by prohibiting employers in wealthier countries from shirking
their responsibilities under their home country's law.^^ The NLC acknowledged
61. Givat Ze ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 36(7).
62. Id. at \ 44. Recourse to public policy to ensure equality is only necessary with respect to
the private employers. The municipal council is the arm of the military commander, who, as a public
authority under Israeli law, is prohibited by Israeli administrative law from discriminating among
employees. Id. at 1| 43. See also HCJ 663/78 Kiryat Arba Adm. v. Nat'l Labor Ct. 33(2) PD 398,
403-04 [1979] (Isr.).
63. On the contact count approach under Israeli law, see Rhona Schuz, On the 'Closest
Connection' Approach in Israeli Private International Law, 4 MOZNEI MiSHPAT 349 (2005) (in
Hebrew).
64. Givat Ze'ev, Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 25. See also Civile 83875/95 (TA) CivilC
(TA) 83875/95 Muhamada v. Yehoshua and Menora (1998) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(unpublished) (in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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that in the present case, such protection was irrelevant.^^ Indeed, the issue was
not cross-border movement of employees, but rather the cross-border movement
of employers. As one employer candidly argued, some private businesses
relocate to the West Bank in order to benefit from the lower standard of living,
the captive market, and water and land resources.^^ When the situation is one of
intemational outsourcing, protection of the weaker parfy is guided by principles
different to those reflected in the Rome Convention. This could have led the
NLC to reject the presumption in the Rome Convention as a guide, or at least to
diminish its relative weight.
Worker's Hotline, an Israeli NGO, appealed the NLC's judgment before
the HCJ. The HCJ affirmed the NLC's holding that the appropriate choice of
law method with respect to contracts is that contracts count. However, it rejected
the dominance of a single territorial link in determining the law goveming the
contract. It first pointed out that both the Rome Convention and the U.S.
Restatement of the Law (Second) Conflict of Laws, 1971 ("Second
Restatement") call for an overall weighted evaluation of contacts with respect to
each specific provision of a contract.^^ The couri noted (inaccurately) that only
the European system contains a presumption that the law of the place of
performance is applicable to employment confracts.^^ The Couri then
emphasized that, to ensure a just outcome, a choice of law determination must
take into account national and intemational public interests as well as personal
interests. Where labor relations are concemed, particular weight should be given
to the public, non-derogable content of mles^^ that address the power disparities
between employer and employee.^'' This, the HCJ stated, is also the approach of
the European and US systems.^' Furthermore, where concrete contacts are
absent, the couri may rely on objective ones, such as the law applicable to
65. Givat Ze 'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 25(d).
66. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 10. Nituv Management and Development argued that
employers who had moved their business to the West Bank had relied on lower production costs,
based on the applicability of Jordanian law. See Nituv Mgmt. and Dev., Ubor Ct. (BS) 35/3400;
SHIR HEVER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION—REPRESSION BEYOND
EXPLOITATION 62 (2010). In 2001, Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan estimated the economic
value of the reliance on Palestinian labor at approximately 10 percent of Israel's GDP. See
SHIMSHON BICHLER & JONATHAN NITZAN, FROM WAR PROFITS TO PEACE DIVIDEND 178 (2001 ) (in
Hebrew).
67. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 atHH 13-15.
68. Id. at II 19. The U.S. Restatement ineludes the place of performance as a potential contact,
noting also that if the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same
state, the loeal law of this state will usually be applied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS, supra note 45, at § 188(3).
69. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 17.
70. Id. at II21. This was the last mention of these power disparities in the judgment.
71. Id. at II 22. This statement is inaccurate with respeet to the European approach, where
mandatory mies of both kinds do not play a role in determining the proper law of the contract but
only mitigate its effects where necessary.
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similar contracts, between similar parties, in similar circumstances.^^
With respect to the case at hand, the Court opined that since there is no
single uniform legal system applicable in the settlements, the link between the
employment relations and the West Bank law as the law of the place of
negotiation and performance was particularly weak. Thus, the Court reasoned
that in this situation the ordinary expeetation that territorial law would apply is
diminished, while other contacts gain importance, such as the currency,
language of documents, days of rest, and even payment of tax in Israel in one
instance (all of which were also noted by the NLC but not attributed much
importance). The Court concluded that the labor relations of the Palestinian
employees in the settlements were more closely connected to Israeli law than to
Jordan and its law.^-'
The Court then added that its conclusion was supported by the guiding
principles of labor law, which call for a choice of law that would ensure equality
between employees carrying out equivalent work^^ without distinction based on
ethnicity or nationality.^^ According to the Court, since Palestinians are
employed in Israel under Israeli law, and since Israelis are employed in the
settlements under Israeli law (a faet which is only implied in the HCJ judgment
and mentioned briefly in the NLC's ruling), equality requires that Palestinians in
the settlements should also be employed under Israeli law.^^ The Court's
analysis nonetheless disregards the fact that the choice of the place of
performance as a connecting factor is itself a mle that aims, inter alia, to ensure
equality between employees. In other words, the obstacle to equality among
employees is not presented by the choice of law rule, but rather by the non-
uniformity of the law that applies within the West Bank.
Finally, in a concurring opinion, Judge Jubran stressed Israeli law's
prohibition of discrimination on ethnic or national grounds, as well as the
intemational human right to equality in employment under ILO Convention
Article 111 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.^' Judge Jubran
added that Israeli law should prevail over Jordanian law also because it is more
protective of employees.^^ His opinion concluded that, "in practice, the Israeli
exclaves are legally Israeli villages, at least with respect to the Israeli law and
72. W. at II 18.
73. /(^. at ini 25-26.
74. W. at II 26.
75. W. at II 21.
76. Id. at II26.
77. Id. at 11 3 (Jubran, J. concurring). See generally. Intemational Labor Organization,
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, July 5, 1958, l.L.O No. I l l , 362
U.N.T.S 31; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2I7(1II), 71 (Dec. Ê0, 1948).
78. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 10 (Jubran, J. concurring). On the 'better mle of law'
doctrine as a means of resolving conflicts of law under U.S. law, see ROBERT A. LEFLAR, Conflicts
Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. RBV. 1584, 1587-88 (1996).
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specifically labor law."^^ Since the Israeli employees in the enclaves are
govemed by Israeli law, Palestinian employees should also be govemed by
Israeli law.^ *'
In sum, the HCJ's ruling is based on three tiers:
1. The place of performance should not be overstated as a contact for a
choice of law determination in contracts, neither in general nor in specific
circumstances.
2. A weighted contacts count links the confracts most closely to Israeli
law.
3. As a matter of legal policy, equality between employees requires that
identical law apply to all employees, therefore Israeli law must apply also
to labor relations between the Palestinian employees and their Israeli
employers.
The HCJ's opinion leans heavily on policy analysis, a characteristic of the
US approach (in contrast to the NLC's European approach). It differs from that
of the NLC in two main respects. First, it attached different weight and
significance to place of performance, leading to a diamefrically opposite result
of the NLC in the weighted contacts count. Second, while the NLC regarded
equality between employees as no more than a potenfial public policy
qualification to the application of the foreign law identified as the most closely
related to the contract, the HCJ regarded such equality as an element in
determining the choice of law rule itself. These different approaches as to the
choice of law analysis have important ramifications in other areas of law that
have barely been addressed by the Courts, namely public intemational law and
labor law. These are explored in Part IV.
C. The Aftermath of Worker 's Hotline
Before widening the perspective of the analysis, however, it is important to
highlight the judgment's practical consequences. The goal of the HCJ, admirable
as it was, can, and has been, easily fhasfrated. As Cass Sunstein notes,
"[b]ecause rules have clear edges, they allow people to 'evade' them by
engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the same or
analogous harms."^' As often happens in law and in employment law in
particular, individuals and corporations react to the new rules by redesigning
their conduct in a manner that preserves the economic sfructure and the power
relations that the law intended to prohibit. Thus, the HCJ's Worker's Hotline
ruling not only identified the justification for subjecting an employment
relationship in the settlements to Israeli law under choice of law mies, but also,
perhaps inadvertently, offered guidelines for the exemption of employment
79. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1|11 (Jubran, J. concurring) (author's ti-anslation).
80. Id
81. Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 995 (1995). See also Yuval
Feldman, Ex Ante vs. Ex-Post: Optimizing State Intervention in Exploitive Triangular Employment
Relationships, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 751 (2009).
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relationships from Israeli law. An Israeli employer may abide by Worker's
Hotline and still manage to avoid the reach of Israeli law in two different
fashions, both of which have already been put into practice.
One way in which an employer can stay true to the letter of Worker's
Hotline yet circumvent its spirit is by entering into an express agreement with
the employee on the issue of applicable law. In the HCJ's judgment as well as in
subsequent rulings, the courts clarify that the legal analysis, which includes a
choice of law determination (e.g., the contact count) and substantive legal
principles (e.g., equality), is necessary because the parties did not agree on the
applicable law. As could well have been expected, since the Worker's Hotline
ruling, Israeli employers have drafted new contracts with their Palestinian
employees stipulating that Jordanian law will govern the employment
relationship.^^ The validity and weight of these provisions has yet to be assessed
by the courts. In particular, the courts will have to flesh out the principle that,
barring exceptional circumstances,^^ the court will give effect to an express
agreement by the parties regarding the law governing the contract.^'' In labor
law employees' consent to waive their rights is met with suspicion (if not
dismissal) in light of the existing power disparities,^^ such that waiver
provisions are suspect even if they purport to address the applicable legal system
rather than substantive law.^^ Such a waiver is analogous to employees'
'consent' to waive an entire bundle of rights, such as that associated with their
status as employees. ^ ^ Since employee status is the origin of an array of rights, it
is ludicrous to suggest that although employees may not waive specific rights
(e.g., minimum wage), they may waive their status as employees, which
provides the basis for those rights. Along the same lines, the power disparities
between employer and employee mean that suspicion should attach to an
employee's consent (e.g., through a choice of law stipulation) to an employment
82. See, e.g.. Labor Ct. (Jer.) 3452/09 Jahalin v. Munieipality of Ma'ale Adumim (2011),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (unpublished) (lsr.). See also E-mail ñ-om Gilad Noam,
Attorney, to author (May 1, 2011 ) (on file with authors).
83. In Labor Appeal, the NLC ruled that the agreement between two Israelis, signed in Israel,
according to which Cyprus law would apply should not be respected. LaborA (Jer.) 418/06
Nehushtan v. Classiea Int'l (2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (lsr.). According to the
NLC, foreign law should apply only where there is true and informed consent, that includes
familiarity with the law chosen. Id. In the relevant case, the NLC concluded that the sole reason for
the purported application of Cyprus law was to avoid Israeli tax law. Id.
84. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 23
85. PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW 25-26 (3rd
ed. 1983).
86. Fausto Pocar, La protection de la partie faible en droit international privé, COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L L. 188, 356 (1984); PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 141-43 (1999). See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317
F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003).
87. KEITH W. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW 53-55 (1966). See Young &
Woods Ltd. V. West, [1980] I.R.L.R.(CA) (Eng.) and the discussion in COLLINS, EwiNG &
McCOLGAN, .su/?ra note 36, at 546-48.
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relationship under a legal structure that is less beneficial than the sfructure that
would otherwise apply. Admittedly, since Jordanian law does have a real
connection with the contract, under general choice of law doctrine, a choice of
Jordanian law as that goveming the contract would not be regarded, prima facie,
as unreasonable or in bad faith.^^ Nonetheless, the particular context in which
the matter arises (i.e., labor law) requires a more cautious approach. If the
contact count is perceived as leading unambiguously to Israeli law, any other
choice would be suspect as an attempt to circumvent protective mies.
Employers seeking to avoid the application of Israeli law to an employment
relationship with Palestinian employees also frequently use manpower agencies
and service providers, a highly prevalent technique in the Israeli labor market."^
These firms are often used only for 'payrolling' purposes, creating the
appearance that the agency or service provider is the legal employer, and thus
allowing the tme employer to circumvent obligations that would govem a direct
employment relationship based in collective agreements.^ *^ The organization of
work through chain suppliers rather than a single firm may establish conditions
for potential injustice.^' In the context of choice of law, using an intermediary
Palestinian company as a service provider or manpower agency to hire
Palestinian employees may enable an Israeli employer to deliberately
manipulate the contact count away from Israeli law. NGOs have begun to collect
evidence of this practice,^^ and one variant of such an arrangement has already
reached the courts: following a public tender, the Civil Administration
confracted a Palestinian employer to provide services in the Beitunya crossing
between Israel and the West Bank. One of the Israeli companies competing for
the tender, Dynamica 2002 Ltd., petitioned the HCJ, claiming that, following
Worker's Hotline, the winning offer should not have been considered since it
relied on a pay structure (minimum wage and benefits) that was illegal under
Israeli law.^^ The Civil Adminisfration argued that a significant difference
underlay the two cases: while Worker's Hotline involved an Israeli employer.
88. Contrast with NYGH, supra note 86, at 140.
89. Guy Mundlak, The Israeli System of Labor Law: Sources and Form, 30 COMP. LAB. L.&
POL'Y J. 159, 175 (2009); Guy Davidov, Enforcement Problems in 'Informal' Labor Markets: A
View from Israel, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 3, 10 (2005).
90. See generally Judy Fudge, The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, Precarious Work and
Labour Protection, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW 295 (Guy Davidov & Brian
Langille eds., 2006); Simon Deakin, The Changing Concept of Employer in Labour Law, 30
INDUSTRIAL L. J. 72 (2001); Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical
Disintegration to Employment Protection Laws, 10 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1990); ALAN SUPIOT,
BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE 17-22
(2001).
91. Hugh Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Common Patterns of
Economic Integration, 53 MODERN L. REV. 731, 736 (1990).
92. Kav LaOved, Palestinian Workers in West Bank Settlements - 2008, KAV LAOVED, (June,
20 2009), http://www.kavlaoved.org.il/media-view_eng.asp?id=2356.
93. HCJ 1234/10 Dynamica 2002 Ltd. v. Civil Adm., July 10, 2010, % 12 (July 10, 2010),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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the case at hand concemed a Palestinian employer who was not bound by Israeli
law. The HCJ was not provided with information as to the content of the
contracts between the Palestinian employer and his employees. Proceeding on
the assumption that there was no express agreement between the parties to apply
Israeli law, it applied the contact count to determine which law should apply.
The Court accepted the imporiance of the employer's identity as a determining
factor in this count, and added that no contacts to the contrary (e.g., use of
Hebrew as the language of the confracts, use of Israeli currency for payment,
reliance on Jewish holidays as days of rest, etc.) had been proven. The Court
concluded that the contract's only contact with Israeli law was the fact that the
Civil Administration ordered the work. According to the Court, this contact was
not sufficient for the application of Israeli law. The court therefore confirmed
the validity of the Jordanian law-based offer.^ '^
The obvious conclusion from this recent judgment is that unless courts look
at apparently innocuous agreements in context, Israeli employers can abide by
the dictates of Worker's Hotline and still offer their employees terms that are
only acceptable under Jordanian law, simply by incorporating a Palestinian
company as an intermediary.^^
The principle of equality between Israeli and Palestinian employees is also
easy to circumvent. For example, in Dynamica the Court reiterated the Worker's
Hotline conclusion that Israeli and Palestinian workers may not work under
different laws, but found that "unlike the situation in Worker's Hotline, where
Palestinian and Israeli workers were employed together, here only Palestinian
workers are involved."^^ Consequently, applying Jordanian law to the contracts
of the Palestinian employees was not discriminatory.^^
Finally, it is possible to distinguish the terms of employment along national
divides through legislation. In a case brought before the Be'er-Sheva Regional
Labor Court, eighty-four Palestinians who had been employed in the Erez
Industrial Zone (EIZ) brought claims against their Israeli employers for
severance pay under Israeli law.^^ The EIZ is not a municipality inhabited and
govemed by Israeli citizens, but a territory confrolled by the Israeli military. In
one of the first cases to rely on the HCJ ruling in Worker's Hotline, the Regional
Labor Court accepted the claim for severance pay.^^ The Court acknowledged
that Israeli businesses had "flocked" to the EIZ over a period of thirty-six years
94. Id.
95. On the use of contact factors that are vulnerable to manipulation by one party, see Wilhelm
Wengler, The Significance of the Principle of Equality in the Conflict of Laws, 28 L. & CONT.
PROBLEMS 822,831-32 (1963).
96. Dynamica 2002 Ltd., HCJ 1234/10 at 1| 12.
97. Id
98. Ubor Ct. (BS) 2142/06 Ashkantana v. Az-Rom (2008), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
99. Id.
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to enjoy the advantages of cheap labor. ""^  Yet, arguably, this was not sufficient
a reason for the Court to conclude that the parties "agreed" to apply the
territorial law (in this case, Egyptian law) to their contracts. On appeal, the NLC
confirmed the application of Israeli law to the case at hand, but mied that the
Disengagement Plan (according to which Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip
have been dismantled and their residents removed into Israeli territory) should
be viewed as a frustration of the employment contracts, exempting the employer
from the obligation to pay severance to the Palestinian employees.'^' At the
same time, an inquiry into the rights of Israeli employees in the EIZ reveals that
the Law for the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan (2005) states, inter
alia, that Israeli employees who work in factories located in the Gaza Strip area,
and who have lost their place of employment following the disengagement plan,
are entitled to "adaptation" payments.'^^ Somewhat surprisingly, only Justice
Rosenfeld, the dissenting judge in the NLC, raised the matter of discrimination
between Israeli and Palestinian employees. She stated, "although it is true that
the [d]isengagement law refers only to Israeli workers, while here we are
concemed with Palestinian workers, it is unthinkable to distinguish between an
Israeli and a non-Israeli worker when applying the legal definition of the end of
the employment relationship.""'•^Apparently, it is thinkable, as the majority did
not address the issue at all.
We find that various courts' efforts to ascertain the rights of Palestinians
who work for Israeli employers have led to a very unsatisfactory result. The
reason for this result is that the courts have approached the entitlement to certain
employees' rights as a choice-of-law question. The situation is ftirther
complicated because Israeli employers in the West Bank are "repeat players" "'''
that can (and arguably do) adjust their behavior according to judicial signals. To
deal with this problem, we propose an altemative analysis, outside the choice of
law issue. The substantive quandary stems from the fact that Israel controls
areas in the West Bank; public and private Israeli employers employ Israelis and
Palestinians in that area; and Israelis are entitled to a bundle of employment
rights as if they were living in Israel. The question before us is whether this
factual background calls for the conclusion that Palestinian employees should
also be entitled to employment rights as if they were living in Israel. We
continue our discussion by inquiring why Israelis working in the occupied
territories are entitled to the same rights they would have if they were living in
100. W. at II 23.
101. The Court mentioned that over 1,000 Palestinian employees were already engaged in legal
disputes against their former Israeli employers for severance pay following the disengagement.
LaborA 256/08 Koka v. Schwartz \ 25 (2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
102. Law for the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan, 5795-2005 S.H. No. 1982 p. 142
sects. 49, 60 (Isr.).
103. Koka, LaborA 256/08 at H 24 (Rosenfeld, J.).
104. Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95 (1974).
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Israel. Then we examine the implications of this entitlement for Palestinians
working for Israeli employers.
III.
FEELING AT HOME: WHY ARE ISRAELIS IN THE WEST BANK. SUBJECT TO ISRAELI
LAW?
There is a commonplace perception within Israel society (and beyond it)
that Israeli settlers live in the settlements under Israeli law. In order to
understand the source and implications of this perception, it is necessary to
explicate the law applicable in the settlements.
The HCJ's starting point in Worker's Hotline was that the legal regime
applicable in the West Bank is the law of occupation.'*'^ Under the law of
occupation, local law that was in force prior to the occupation remains binding,
unless it is amended by enactments of the military commander."'^
However, with respect to Israeli residents of the West Bank, there are four
additional layers, commonly referred to as the 'law of the exclaves.' The Court
only referred to two. The first layer consists of military enactments that
duplicate a select body of Israeli legislation to the settlements' territory.'°' The
other layer is Israeli legislation that applies to Israeli residents in the West Bank
on a personal basis. "'^ The purpose of these two layers of norms is to enable
Israelis moving to the settlements to maintain their lifestyle as if they continued
to live under Israeli sovereignty and law, despite the different legal regime to
which they become formally subject. Consequently, the settlements have
become exclaves where Israeli law applies, connecting them legally,
economically, and socially to Israel. "^ ^ The remaining two layers of norms make
the legal regime applicable to settlers appear identical to Israeli law. One is
comprised of collective agreements that govern the employment of Israeli
employees in the occupied territories. The other is the consensual application of
105. In the past there was much dispute whether the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were
occupied territories in terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel contended that they were not,
since Jordan had no sovereign title to the territory. However, at no time did Israel claim that the
West Bank was under Israeli sovereignty, nor was it ever disputed that it was an occupied territory
within the terms of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Furthermore, ñ'om the early 1970s, Israel has
undertaken to act in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
In recent years, it has largely stopped arguing the de jure inapplicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 198 (2002).
106. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 16, at art. 43.
107. See Order on Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria) 1981, No. 892
(Isr.); Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at1| 11.
108. Law for the Extension of the Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria—Criminal
Adjudication and Judicial Assistance), 5767-1967 S.H. 517, art. 6B and the Annex at p. 20 (Isr.) (as
extended and amended).
109. BENVENISTI, supra note 18 at 135.
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Israeli law when an Israeli employer contracts with an Israeli employee in the
settlements. These two layers, given the courts' failure to consider their unique
relevance to the predicament facing Palestinian employees, merit .special notice.
The following sections consider each of the four avenues in greater detail, with
particular reference to labor law.
A. The Military Commander's Enactments: The Municipal Councils ' Code
In 1981, the Military Commander established the regional and municipal
councils in the West Bank. The Order on Administration of Municipal Councils
(Judea and Samaria) (No. 892) (1981) provides:
The IDF commander in the region may set in the Code rules for the
administration of municipal councils and regarding powers and administrative
arrangements concerning the affairs of council residents. " "
The Military Commander subsequently enacted the Code of the Municipal
Councils."' This Code, a military enactment, duplicates a host of Israeli
primary and secondary legislation to the territory of the settlements (which are
defined as municipal councils for the purpose of the Order). When Israeli
legislation is amended, the Code is correspondingly amended."^ Indeed, Justice
Rivlin quotes Amnon Rubinstein, who pointed out, "a resident of Maale-
Adumim [settlement], for example, is putatively subject to military rule and the
local Jordanian law, but actually lives according to Israeli laws with respect to
his personal law and with respect to the local authority where he lives. The
military government is nothing but a sign, through which the Israeli law and
administration operate."' '-^
The Code provides that "rights, duties, authorities and sanctions provided
by the laws incorporated in the Code will apply mutatis mutandis as if they were
provided by the Code, but they will not govern a resident of the settlements with
respect to a person who is not a resident, unless otherwise stipulated by the
annexes.""^ The effect of this provision is that the enforcement of obligations
under the laws in the Code is only possible against a resident of the settlements
110. Order on Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria), 5741 -1981, No. 892
(lsr.). See also Order on Administration of Regional Councils, 5739-1979, No. 783 (lsr.).
111. Order on Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria), 5741-1981, No. 892
(lsr.).
112. The Order concerning Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria)
(Amendment No. 4) allows the extensioh of the settlements' regime to areas outside them. See Order
Concerning Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria) (Amendment No. 4), 5767-
1997 No. 1453 (lsr.). This order enables extension of the 'enclave law' to the industrial areas
adjaeent to the settlements. Id.
113. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| II (quoting Amnon Rubinstein, The Changing
Character of the "Territories": from Trust to a Legal Hybrid, 11 lYUNEl MiSHPAT 439 (1986) (in
Hebrew)).
114. Order on Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria) 1981, No. 892, art.
140 (B) (lsr.).
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with respect to conduct towards other residents of the settlements, but not, for
example, with respect to conduct towards Palestinians. Moreover, although the
wording of this provision limits only enforcement of laws, it has been
interpreted as limiting also the substantive content of the laws incorporated in
the Code, so that the Code only benefits residents of the settlements (who are
invariably Israeli nationals or registered residents). In short, the Code applies
Israeli legislation (listed in the annexes) only in the settlements and only with
respect to Israeli residents of the settlements."^
Annex 6 of the Code, entitled "Labor Law," incorporates the following
Israeli legislation: Minimum Wage Law, 1987;"^ the Employment Service
Law, 1959;"^ the Foreign Workers Law, 1991;"^ the Emergency Labor Law,
1967;"^ cost of living allowance extension orders; those sections of the
Collective Agreements Law, 1957, that are necessary for the application of
extension orders to the settlements; Emergency Work Service, 1967; Foreign
Workers Law, 1991; and secondary legislation authorized by these laws. '^ *^
In Givat Ze 'ev the NLC pointed out that the laws incorporated in the Code
are not relevant to the case at hand.'^' The HCJ only alluded to the Code when
it mentioned "military enactments applicable only to the settlements."'^^
However, the norms incorporated by the Code, such as enforcement mechanisms
in the Minimum Wage Law, distinguish their beneficiaries not only on the basis
of territory but also on an individual basis, since the Code is exclusive to Israeli
residents in the settlements. Neither court considered it necessary to examine the
legality of a legal insfrument that applies in this discriminatory manner. It is
worth noting that Israeli labor law does not generally differentiate between
115. Id.\ Communication with Ariel Yosefi, Office of the Legal Advisor for Judea and Samaria,
Military Advocate General's Office, Dec. 8, 2008.
116. TTie Municipal Councils Code applies the Israeli Minimum Wage Law 5748-1987, S.H.
1211, p. 68 to the benefit of Israeli residents of the settlements only. See Order on Administration of
Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria) 5741-1981, No. 892 (Isr.). Order No. 967, discussed above,
extended the benefit of minimum wage to Palestinian employees of Israelis within the settlements.
See Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations (Judea and Samaria), 5742-1982,
No. 967, Art. 3 (Jordan). Order 1605, extends this benefit to employees of any Israeli employer
within the West Bank. See Order Regarding Employment of Workers in Certain Locations
(Amendment 3) (Judea and Samaria), 5788-2007, No. 1605 (Jordan) (adding Art. 3B to Order No.
967). However, Israeli residents of the settlements benefit fi-om all provisions of the Minimum Wage
Law while Palestinian employees in the settlements benefit only from the basic right to minimum
wages but not from the additional mies guaranteeing this right. See LaborA 786/06 Ben-Or Toys v.
Akhram Sultan (2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
117. Employment Service Uw, 5719-1959, S.H. 270 p. 32 (Isr.).
118. Foreign Workers Law (Illegal Employment), 5761 -1991, SH 1349 p. 112 (Isr.).
119. Emergency Ubor Uw, 5727-1967, SH 503 p. 86 (Isr.).
120. Order on Administration of Municipal Councils (Judea and Samaria) 1981, No. 892,
Annex 6, §1 (Isr.).
121. Givat Ze 'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98, at 1|14.
122. Worker 's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03, at 1| 11.
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workers on the basis of their nationality;'^-' the consfruction applicable to
nationals in the West Bank is therefore exceptional.
B. Extraterritorial Application of Israeli Legislation
Israeli legislation provides that certain Israeli laws apply to Israeli
individuals even outside Israel. Some legislation (e.g., extensive sections of the
Penal Law of 1977) applies to Israeli nationals and residents regardless of where
they are located.'^'* Similarly, Israeli nationals and residents are subject to
taxation in Israel even with respect to work performed outside the country.'
Some legislation extends extraterritorially specifically to Israelis who reside in
the West Bank. The Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria - Criminal
Adjudication and Judicial Assistance of 1967) extend the application of
seventeen Israeli laws to Israelis residing in the West Bank. These laws'^^ do
not apply to Palestinians, even when they are physically within the area of a
settlement. '^^ Other legislative instmments contain specific provisions that
extend them to Israeli citizens (or persons entitled to citizenship, i.e., Jews) who
are residents of the West Bank. '^^ The legislation applicable exfraterritorially in
these manners does not include labor law. It is nonetheless of interest because it
forms pari of the background against which the employment relationship
between Israeli employers and Palestinian employees is understood.
Alongside the extension of Israeli legislation to the West Bank through
express stipulation in the law, Israeli legislation has also been extended to Israeli
residents in the West Bank by judicial construction and interpretation. One
example is KPA Steel v. State of Israel }^'^ an appeal of a criminal conviction for
tax evasion. The question before the HCJ was whether the interpretation of the
123. The term 'nationality' is used as the intemational aspect of citizenship, namely the formal
link between a state and an individual.
124. Penal Uw, 5111-\911, 8 LSI 133, art. 15 (Isr.)
125. Income Tax Order, 5707-1947, art. 2 (amended 1989) (Isr.).
126. Among which are key instmments such as the Uw on Elections, Income Tax Ordinance,
Social Securify Uw, and Military Service Uw, as well as minor instruments such as the Uw on
Surrogacy Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Newbom).
127. The Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria — Criminal Adjudication and Judicial
Assistance), supra note 107. Emergency Regulations constitute primary legislation under Israeli law.
Their validify is temporary, and therefore they are renewed periodically. In 2007 the Emergency
Regulations (Judea and Samaria - Criminal Adjudication and Judicial Assistance) (1967) were
renewed for a period of 5 years, until 2012. Their validity was limited to exelude the Gaza Strip, to
which they applied until then. See Uw Amending and Extending the Emergency Regulations (Judea
and Samaria and Gaza Strip) (Criminal Adjudication and Judicial Assistance), 5767-2007, SH No.
2100, p. 363.
128. See, e.g.. National Insurance Uw [Consolidated Version], art. 378, 1995-5795, SH No.
1522, p. 207 (Isr.); National Insurance Regulations (Applicabilify to Special Types of Insurees),
5747-1987, KT No. 5022 p. 747 (Isr.).
129. See CrimA 123/83 ICPA Steel v. Israel 38(1) PD 813, 1| 8 [1984] (Isr.); CA 1432/03
Yinnon v. Kara'an 59(1) PD 345 [2004] (Isr.).
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provision in the Income Tax Ordinance extended its application to Israelis
residing in the West Bank. ' •'^  The HCJ mied that a wide interpretation of the
extension, necessary for charging the defendant with tax evasion, was legitimate
under the rules on choice of law, given the settlers' expectation that tax law
applies to them in all aspects.'-" This ruling is at odds with the principle that
criminal provisions should be interpreted narrowly, and with the fact that choice
of law doctrine applies only in private law matters. The same notion of
extraterritorial extension of Israeli law to Israelis in the West Bank was taken a
step further in rulings that did not interpret an explicit extension provision as in
KPA Steel, but determined that there was an implicit provision to that effect. In
Bitton V. Helman, for example, the Jerusalem District Court extended the
licensing regulation under the Real Estate Agents Law to Israeli business
conducted in the West Bank.'^^ The court explained, inter alia, that the
application of the Law to business in the West Bank was in line with the
jurisprudence that "over the years, one step at a time, when confronted with a
case that involves Israeli [citizens] living in Judea and Samaria, did everything
possible to apply Israeli law to them and to view them as Israelis for all intents
and purposes."'-'^ Of particular interest is the willingness of the courts to extend
the application of Israeli public law on the basis of parties' expectations, a
notion which belongs to the realm of private law. The laxness of the courts in
applying established legal docfrines (such as the interpretation of criminal law or
the distinction between public and private law) illusfrates their disregard for
legal mechanisms that a sovereign state should employ if it wishes to extend its
law to an occupied territory. Such offhandedness in extending Israeli law to the
settlements only reinforces the perception that the settlements are subject to
Israeli law.
Applying the occupying power's domestic legislation to the occupied
territory, whether expressly or by interpretation, is not without difficulty from an
intemational legal perspective. In general, the occupant's civilian institutions are
bound by the same constraints as the military commander, namely Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations.'^^ This includes the legislature, which is generally
prohibited from legislating for occupied territory, because such legislation
amounts to the unilateral annexation of an occupied territory. Nonetheless,
Israeli courts have mied that the power of the Knesset (Israel's parliament) to
legislate for the occupied territory, at least for Israeli nationals, is not necessarily
130. CrimA (123/83 KPA Steel v. Israel 38(1) PD 813,11 8 [1984] (Isr.)).
131. Id
132. CC (Jer.) 6718/05 Bitton v. Helman, 7 (2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(Isr.).
133. Bitton, CC (Jer) 6718/05 at 7 (citing CA (Jer.) 739/03; Gaoni v. Cohen, (Mar. 11, 2003)
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.), in which the District Court confirmed the powers of
the head of execution office in the West Bank).
134. BENVENISTI, supra note 18, at 20.
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resfricted by the law of occupation, for example with respect to taxation. ' ^^ This
practice seems, at first glance, to follow post-World War II jurisprudence that
has recognized as valid the application of an occupant's national law to its own
nationals in the occupied territory. However, post-World War II jurisprudence
developed with respect to nationals who were members of the occupant's
military forces or related to those forces.'-'^ The situation with regard to other
nationals—such as civilian settlers—is not as clear. Benvenisti argues that from
a law of occupation perspective, the test should be whether the application of the
national law would, directly or indirectly, have adverse effects on the local
public order and on short and long-term local interests.'^^ For example, to the
extent that personal extraterritorial application of the occupant's law results in
encouraging its nationals to emigrate to the occupied territory, this might
impinge on the local "public order and civil life" and would thus be prohibited
by intemational law.'-'^ It would also run counter to the express prohibition in
Article 49 of the Geneva Convention on the transfer by the occupants of parts of
its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. Arguably, this is
pertinent to Israel, where the legislation for nationals in the occupied territory
was enacted precisely in order to allow civilians to live in the West Bank (and
Gaza Strip) under a standard similar to (if not higher than) that to which they
were accustomed within Israel's national borders, as part of the campaign to
encourage relocation to the settlements. ' ^^
A further difficulty in the extraterritorial application of Israeli law to
Israelis is that it results in the differential application of legal regimes based on
nationality within the West Bank territory. Prima facie, this is a discriminatory
measure. One might argue that nationality-based discrimination exists whenever
a state extends its law extraterritorially, and yet such a measure is not
categorically prohibited under intemational law. However, the situation at hand
is different from that of ordinary extraterritorial legislation, where the legislating
state has no territorial control and can only prescribe for individuals related to it
on a personal basis. In the present case, the state has territorial control and
therefore bears the onus of proving that the distinction by nationality is justified
with respect to each item of legislation, as it would with respect to legislation
applicable within its ovra territory and even more. While a state may distinguish
between nationals and non-nationals in particular instances (e.g., with respect to
political rights), labor law is generally considered territorial, and distinctions on
the basis of nationality are illegal.''"' Moreover, the preferential treatment of
135. KPA Steel, CrimA 123/83 at 1| 9.
136. BENVBNISTI, supra note 18, at 21-22.
137. Id.
138. Amir Paz-Fuchs & Alon Cohen-Lifshitz, The Changing Character of Israel's Occupation:
Planning and Civilian Control, 8\ TOWN PLANNING REV. 585 (2010).
139. See id
140. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1, 660 U.N.T.S.
195(1965).
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nationals in occupied territory rriay suggest expansionist ambitions that
contravene the right to self-determination of peoples.
C. Collective Agreements
As noted earlier. Annex 6 to the Code applies to the settlements' procedural
sections of the Collective Agreements Law that are necessary for the application
of extension orders.'^' By inference. Annex 6 does not apply to those sections
of the collective agreements that have not been extended by specific orders.
How do these arrangements affect employers, subject to collective agreements
(either by signing directly or through membership in an employer's union),
operating in the West Bank? This question concerns relations not only between
employers and Palestinian employees, but also between those employers and
Israeli employees. The confusion stems from a peculiar state of affairs: a
collective agreement law exists in Israel, which creates a binding normative
structure for an Israeli employer who wishes to sign it (directly or through an
employers' union). Counter to the differing employment conditions experienced
by different employers and Palestinian workers, Israeli jurisprudence seeks to
apply rights that derive from collective agreements to all workers within the
firm. The following are the parameters governing collective agreements in
Israeli labor law: first, unless explicitly stated,''*^ the collective agreement
applies to all employees in the firm;'^-' second, the workforce is viewed as a
single business and as a single bargaining unit with distinctions between groups
of employees permitted only as an exception to the rule'^^ that views the
workforce in a single business as a single bargaining unit; and third, certain
distinctions between employees (e.g., on the basis of ethnic or national origin,
gender, age, etc.) are prohibited.'''^
And yet, the NLC reasoned, the Collective Agreements Law (1957) applies
only to Israeli employees of an Israeli employer operating in the West Bank. In
addition, the NLC stated, "as a matter of course, a collective agreement covers
employees in a particular sector or business who are represented by the
representative union."^'^^ This outcome is in complete contravention of Israeli
collective law principles. However, according to the Israeli Collective
141. Extension orders are ministerial edicts that extend collective agreements to employees and
employers who were not bound by the collective agreement originally.
142. UborA 202/08 Sotovsky v. General Health Serviees (2008), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (lsr.).
143. Collective Agreements Law, 1957-5717, SH No. 221 p. 57, art. 15(3) (lsr.); UborA 42/2-5
Histadrut v. Senior Paz Workers, 14 Ubor Judgments 367(1983), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (lsr.).
144. UborA 55/4-28 Senior Research Staff in the Sec. Org. v. Histadrut, 31 Labor Judgments
54 (1998), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (lsr.).
145. UborA 400024/98 Histadrut v. Tzim, Israeli Shipping Co., 36 Ubor Judgments 97
(2000), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (lsr.).
146. Givat Ze 'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 46 (emphasis added).
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Agreement Law, provisions of a collective agreement apply to all the employees
in a business that is subject to a collective agreement, whether employees are
members in the relevant union, members in a different union, or not members in
any union at all.''*^ Indeed, in Israeli law, "there is no legal connection between
union membership and coverage of collective agreements."'''^ The HCJ made
no mention of the collective agreements regime.
Under what conditions does a collective agreement apply exfraterritorially?
Harry Arthurs notes a 1967 transnational collective agreement purported to
cover American and Canadian workers of Chrysler Corporation, despite the fact
that each group was covered by the law of the jurisdiction in which it worked.'^"
European labor law recognizes the possibility that a collective agreement applies
to employees who are based outside the territory where the collective agreement
was originally signed, solely by virtue of being employed by an employer who
has signed the agreement.'^ *^ This reflects the goal of the European Union to
advance a single market. As such, the conclusion that collective agreements
apply across borders within Europe is a natural extension of what may be termed
European 'economic jurispmdence.' Even more relevant to the case at hand, the
House of Lords analyzed the situation of an expafriate employee of a British
employer operating "within what amounts for practical purposes to an extra-
territorial British enclave in a foreign country."'^' In such a case, argued Lord
Hofftnan, "it would be unrealistic to regard him as having taken up employment
in a foreign community in the same way as if [his employer] were providing
security services for a hospital in Berlin."'^^
No similar 'economic jurispmdence' of integration is applicable with
respect to the West Bank (at least not since the 1990s, when Israel recognized
the economic interest of Palestine as separate from its own).'^^ Therefore, one
could plausibly argue, in contrast to the NLC's ruling, that since the Collective
Agreement Law has not been applied explicitly in the West Bank, collective
agreements do not apply exfraterritorially to Palestinians or to Israelis. The
reality, of course, is that Israelis perceive life in the occupied territories as
identical to life in Israel, and Israeli employers have yet to contest the
147. Collective Agreements Uw, 1957-5717, SH No. 221 p. 57, arts. 15, 16 (Isr.).
148. MUNDLAK, supra note 33, at 79 (emphasis added).
149. Harry Arthurs, Extraterritoriality by Other Means: How Labour Law Sneaks Across
Borders, Conquers Minds and Controls Workplaces Abroad, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 527, 542-
43 (2010). See David H. Blake, Multi-Nationat Corporation, International Union and Intemational
Collective Bargaining: A Case Study of the Political, Social and Economic Implications of the 1967
U.A. W- Chrysler Agreements, in TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF MULTI-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ECONOMIC REGIONALISM ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 137-172
(Hands Günter ed., 1972).
150. ROGER BLANPAIN, EUROPEAN LABOUR LAW 433, sec. 789 (7th ed., 2000).
151. Serco v. Uwson [2006] UICHL 3,1] 39
152. Id.
153. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, supra note 22, at Annex X (Protocol on Economic
Relations).
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application of collective agreements to Israeli workers. •
The attitude of Israeli employers may be changing, as seen in a recent case.
An employer operating in the West Bank argued that he is not required to pay
membership fees to the Israeli employer organization ' ^ ^ on the grounds that an
obligation that stems from the Collective Agreement Act (in this case payment
of membership fees to the employers' union) does not apply to employers
operating in the West Bank. His argument was rejected by the Jemsalem District
Labor Court, which mied that "the claim that Israeli law applies only in the
territory of the state (unless otherwise stated) conflicts with the HCJ's ruling in
Worker's Hotline."^-^ The court held that in Worker's Hotline the HCJ had
ruled that the "contact count" test requires applying Israeli labor law to labor
relations between employees and employers situated in territories, despite the
fact that Israel has avoided applying Israeli law to the West Bank and the vast
majorify of labor statutes do not explicitiy apply to the territories.'^^ This
reading of Worker's Hotline is erroneous: while the HCJ applied Israeli law as a
matter of confractual choice, the Disti-ict Labor Couri interpreted it as an
exfraterritorial application of Israeli labor law in general. The Jerusalem District
Labor Couri's decision demonstrates the insouciance of the couris towards the
extension of Israeli law to the West Bank.
Moreover, in Worker's Hotline the HCJ did not discuss the matter of
collective agreements in general, or the application of the Collective
Agreements Law in particular. The Jerusalem District Labor Court's mling
suggests that the Worker's Hotline decision may reach much furiher than is
implied by the HCJ's language. Another implication of the mling is that an
inquiry into the application of the relevant collective agreements should have
been included in the judgment.
D. Private International Law Principles: Consent and Expectations
Israeli extraterritorial legislation does not include labor law rights and
interests; a limited number of labor laws apply through the Code with respect
only to Israelis (whether employers or employees). Thus, the bulk of labor law
remains regulated by Jordanian law, which, as the territorial law of the West
Bank, applies to both Palestinians and Israelis.
And yet, Israelis employed in the settlements enjoy significantly more
generous employment terms than Palestinians. The reason for the disparify is
that when Israelis employ Israelis in the settlements, they operate under the
premise that Israeli labor law applies, including its statutes, collective
agreements, extension orders, etc. This factual situation was alluded to in the
154. Ubor Ct. (Jer.) 2879/06 Israeli Empl'r Union v. Better & Different (2009), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
155. Id
156. Id.
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HCJ's emphasis on "the legal character of the Israeli settlements as an 'enclave'
which is not de facto subject to the general law that govems that [West Bank]
territory,"'^^ and in Justice Jubran's concurring opinion that "in practice the
Israeli enclaves have the legal status of Israeli towns, at least for the purpose of
application of Israeli law and especially employment law. Workers who have
Israeli citizenship and who work in these enclaves are subject to Israeli
employment law, with all that it implies."'^^ Prima facie, these statements are
erroneous. They imply that the whole of Israeli labor law has been made
applicable to Israelis in the settlements on either a personal or territorial basis.
However, as Chief Justice Barak has noted in a different case, "the
presumption is that Israel legislation applies in Israel and not in the territories
(i.e., in the West Bank), unless it is stated in legislation (expressly or by
implication)."'^^ Since labor law has not been extended to the West Bank, it
could not be presumed to apply, even to the settlements, in the absence of
express extension. On a more charitable reading, emphasizing the term "in
practice" rather than "legally," Justice Jubran's statements refer, not only to the
formal applicability of Israeli law in the settlements, but to the ground-level
reality that as a matter of fact, Israeli settlers enjoy rights, terms and conditions
that are indistinguishable from those enjoyed by employees employed within
Israel. The source for this arrangement lies in the consensual application of
Israeli law when an Israeli employer contracts with an Israeli employee in the
settlements.'^ *^ This choice of law is within the prerogative of any two sides to a
contractual relationship, as long as employees are protected from being
disadvantaged by the employer's choice of law.'^'
This state of affairs is tme with respect to labor law as well. For example,
when transnational corporations enter into employment contracts with
employees who work abroad, they may include provisions that the law of the
home counfry, rather than the country where the work is performed, will apply
to their confracts. Moreover, a law may be "exported sub rosa because its
values, assumptions, or requirements become embedded in the HR policies and
workplace practices of fransnational corporations."'^^ Similarly, if Israeli
employers and employees in the settlements agree that Israeli confract law
applies to their relationships, they are well within their rights to make this
157. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 25.
158. Id. at II 11 (Jubran, J. concurring).
159. HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Minister of Defense Isr. L. Rep. 352,1| 22 (2006) (Isr.) (citing to
A. BARAK, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 579 (vol. 2,1993).
160. The NLC seems to have grasped this, seeing the empty half of the legislative cup. After
describing the relatively few labor laws that have been applied through extraterritorial legislation or
military orders to Israeli settlers, it stated that "from the positive we leam the negative. Israeli laws
that were not applied through military orders do not apply." Givat Ze'ev, Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98
at II 14.
161. COLLINS, EWING & MCCOLGAN, supra note 37, at 42.
162. Arthurs, supra note 149, at 540.
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choice. The problem, addressed in the following section, is that the agreements
reached with Palestinian employees contained different substantive terms from
those contained in the agreements reached with the Israeli employees. This
matter should have been addressed by the NLC and HCJ, but it was ignored
almost completely.
In the absence of express stipulation as to the law governing the
employment relations, it is necessary to identify the law to which the eonfract is
most closely connected.'^^ In the case of Israelis employing Israelis in the West
Bank, it is obvious that, even in the absence of an express manifestation of
consent, both parties expect Israeli law to apply. Thus, in Kiryat Arba,^^'^ the
HCJ dealt, for the first time, with a labor dispute between an Israeli employer
(the Civil Administration, which is an arm of the military commander) and two
Israeli employees in the occupied territories. The HCJ emphasized the identity
of the particular employer in that case, and ruled that the Civil Administration
"carries with it" Israeli law.'^^ In a later case, an employee of the municipality
of the Ariel settlement was dismissed during her pregnancy, in prima facie
breach of Israeli law.'^^ The municipality sought to distinguish the case from
Kiryat Arba, arguing that unlike the Civil Adminisfration, a municipality is not
the "long arm" of the occupying power.'^^ The NLC rejected the argument,
accepting without deliberation the Regional Court's ruling that since the
municipality operated under the authority of the military commander, it was
bound by Israeli labor law.'^^ Given that the settlements and the Israeli
indusfrial zones were also established by military decree, this rationale is
presumably relevant for all employment relations in which the settlements (or
their residents) and indusfrial zones are involved as employers.
Recently, in a situation that mirrors the facts presented in Workers Hotline,
the NLC has gone one step further in applying Israeli law to the resolution of a
dispute relating to work carried out in the West bank. The case, Mahajneh v.
Center for Democracy .and Human Rights, involved an Arab citizen of Israel
who worked as an attomey for a West Bank-based Palestinian NGO that
operated mainly in the occupied territories, but partly in Israel. His confraet with
the employer was written in Arabic and signed in Ramallah (in the West Bank),
and he was paid in American dollars. Following his dismissal, Mahajneh
charged that he was owed salaries and social benefits that had not been paid.
The employer asked for summary dismissal of the claim on the ground that
Israel was forum non conveniens and that the litigation should be held in
163. Menora, CA 419/71, 26(2) PD at 531.
164. See HCJ 663/78 Kiryat Arba Adm. v. Nat'l Labor Ct. 33(2) PD 398 [1979] (Isr.).
165. See id at)] 5.
166. UborA 45/42-3 Efron v. Ariel, 17 Ubor Judgments 209 (1986), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
167. /i/. at II 3.
168. Id
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Palestinian courts, under Jordanian law. The regional court accepted the claim
for summary dismissal, but the NLC reversed the decision, ruling that "an Israeli
employee's reasonable expectation, as an Israeli citizen, is that Israeli law will
apply."'^^ This ruling has several implications. First, it appears that the
employee's Israeli citizenship is, in essence, sufficient to apply Israeli law to an
employment relationship (presumably because of his expectations), even when
the rest of the contacts pull in the other direction. Second, it appears that the
employer's status as a West Bank based company is not a decisive factor that
would necessarily preclude the application of Israeli law. This is significant
since it tempers an employer's ability to manipulate the contact count simply by
using a subcontractor.'^" And, third, the court, in its ability to reach a decision,
seems almost uninhibited by the objective facts. In conclusion, the explicit,
implied, or imputed expectation of parties has been used by the cotirts as a
means for applying Israeli law to disputes that are closely connected with the
West Bank but involve Israelis.
E. Conclusion
The previous sections discuss various layers of norms that together
constitute the legal system applicable in the West Bank. Palestinians are
governed by Jordanian law and military enactment, while Israelis resident in the
settlements are subject, alongside some Jordanian law and military enactments,
to norms from other sources, namely Israeli legislation applied extraterritorially
and the law on collective agreements.
For Israeli residents in the West Bank, the myriad of legal regimes creates a
legal environment that is very similar to that which exists in Israel. This
environment has been achieved by acts of all three arms of government: express
extraterritorial legislation by the legislature, military enactments by the
executive, and expansive and lenient interpretations of law and doctrine by
courts. Yet this application is not systematic, and, combined with the casuistic
method of adjudication, it results in patchy coverage. Moreover, doctrines that
could rationalize gaps in the resulting regime, such as the jurisprudence on
collective agreements, have not been utilized even when abundantly relevant.
This state of affairs is both procedurally and substantively objectionable.
Procedurally, it yields an overly complex legal system that is difficult to apply.
Substantively, the almost casual manner in which domestic courts have extended
Israeli law to the occupied territories, when even the executive and legislator
had not done so, is an issue of concern. The problem is exacerbated when the
unclear legal regime serves as a point of reference in determining the law
applicable to Palestinians employed in the settlements. Unarticulated premises
169. UborA 723/07 Mahajneh v. Ctr. for Democracy and Human Rights, 1 28 (2009) Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (lsr.) (emphasis added).
170. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; Mundlak, supra note 11.
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escape scmtiny, and pertinent mies are overlooked. The infroduction of equality,
itself a fundamental principle of the Israeli legal system, results in the
entrenchment of disparities, as discussed in Pari IV.
IV.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS
Pari III outlined the various components of the legal system that lead to the
application of Israeli law to Israeli employees in Israeli-confrol occupied
territory. We now consider the effect of this application on the employment of
Palestinians, with respect to the securing of minimum standards, and to equality
between Palestinians and Israelis, pariicularly in the terms and conditions of
employment. This latter aspect of equality was not raised at all, let alone
answered, by any of the couris dealing with the issue of the employment of
Palestinians by Israelis in the West Bank.
A. Protective Legislation: Minimum Conditions
Notwithstanding the general rules on choice of law, the HCJ noted that the
unique principles of labor law, derived from the disparity of powers between
employer and employee, require applying mandatory rights and principles, even
if those are not guaranteed under the legal system which the parties have
purporiedly agreed to apply.'^' Indeed, notwithstanding the NLC's and the
HCJ's cursory references to equality of terms and conditions, both courts
actually focused on the question of whether Palestinians employees are entitled
to minimum core rights under Israeli law. This minimum could have been
guaranteed to the Palestinian employees without the sweeping application of
Israeli law to their relations with Israeli employers, and thus without delving
into a jurisprudential and political minefield.
The notion that choice of law rules should aim to protect a weak pariy is
not uncontroversial. In theory, the classical choice of law rules only serve to
indicate the applicable law, without regard to its content. The contents of foreign
law only become relevant if, subsequent to the choice process, they turn out to
conflict with fundamental principles of public policy or with mandatory laws of
the fomm. But neither source of conflict necessarily protects weaker pariies in a
pariicular case. ' ^ ^ However, partly under the influence of the American interest
analysis approach, docfrine has evolved in a manner that directs attention to the
laws competing for application'^-' in order to protect discrete categories of
pariies, including employees. Thus, the Rome Convention recognizes the special
nature of the contract of employment and contains special provisions intended to
171. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 21.
172. Pocar,.su/?ra note 86, at 353-57.
173. NYGH,.supranote86, at 141.
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protect the employee. Ariicle 6(1) provides that a choice of law made by the
pariies shall not deprive the employee of the protection afforded to him or her by
the mandatory rules of the law to which the confract is most closely
connected. ' ^^  This prevents the sfronger parfy from abusing the freedom to
choose the applicable law in order to evade the requirements of protective labor
law. In addition, Ariicle 7(1) provides that "effect may be given to the
mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has a
close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those
mies must be applied whatever the law applicable to the confract."'^^ This refers
to mandatory rules under a legal system which is closely connected to the
contract, but which is not necessarily, the most closely related to it.'^^ The legal
system itself must apply these mies in the circumstances, regardless of the law
generally applicable to the contract. These mies, sometimes referred to as
'directly applicable' (lois d'application immédiate) or 'internationally
mandatory' rules, dispense with the need for a choice of law analysis with
respect to the specific issues that they regulate, because it is not necessary to
establish that the system from which they emanate is the one most closely
connected to the contract. Under both Articles 6 and 7 of the Rome Convention,
the contract would remain subject either to the law most closely connected to it
or to the law chosen by the parties, except with respect to the issues addressed
by either type of mandatory rules. ' ^^  In essence, mandatory rules are similar to
what the NLC referred to as "positive public policy."'^^ They allow the court to
take account of public policy considerations and impose its own law as part of
the contract, in addition to the applicable foreign law. Indeed, in at least one
case, where the NLC refused to apply Israeli law to the Palestinian plaintiffs, the
couri accepted the applicabilify of Israel's Minimum Wage Law on the basis of
public policy.'^^
The unique features of labor law offer another mechanism that enables the
applicabilify of protective labor law to Palestinians employed by Israel settlers.
It may be recalled that the Order on Municipal Councils, from which the Code
derives, applies to residents of the councils (i.e., only to Israeli settlers).'^''
174. Rome Convention, supra note 45, art. 6(1).
175. /i/. at art. 7(1).
176. The term 'close connection' has been criticized as insufficiently precise and predictable,
leading the UK to enter a reservation to the Convention. See David McCelan & ICisch Beevers,
MORRIS' THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 390 (7th ed. 2009); Mario Giuliano & Paul Ugarde, Report on the
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 980 O.J. (C 282), 28-29. For present
purposes this does not present a problem, since the mandatory rules in question are within the Israeli
law, to which the contracts at issue are closely, if not most closely, conneeted.
177. Andrea Bonomi, Mandatory Rules in Private Intemational Law—The Quest for
Uniformity of Decisions in a Global Environment, 1 Y.B. PRIV. INT' L. 215, 227 (1998).
178. See Civat Ze 'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 35 (author's translation).
179. UborA. (Jer.) 300480/95 Makdadi v. Civil Admin, in Judea and Samaria, 35 Ubor
Judgments 70, \ 24 [2000] (Isr.).
180. See supra note 114 and accompanying text; .see infra Section (IV)(B)(ii)(a) Extraterritorial
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However, it is possible to read the Order as establishing the platform not only
for the rights of settlers, but also for their obligations. More precisely, the Code
may be seen as applying to Israelis not only as employees but also as
employers,'^' and consequently to their Palestinian employees.
Employers' obligations may also be particularly apt objects of
extraterritorial application. US courts have recognized Congress' authority to
pass laws that have exfraterritorial effects.'^^ In fact, US legislation contains
provisions that explicitly expand statutes' exfraterritorial reach to American
employers who eonfrol companies incorporated and operating in foreign
counfries.'^^ The same is frue for some British laws.'^'* This approach was also
adopted judicially by the HCJ in a matter closely related to the one under
investigation here. In Kiryat Arba^^^ and in Efron v. Ariel, '^^ the HCJ and NLC
respectively inspected the rights of Israeli employees who were dismissed by
their Israeli employer. The Courts concluded that Israeli law applied to the case
based on the strong connection that the employer has to the Israeli govemment
as the occupying power. The HCJ states that: ' ^ ^
Israeli employees, employed by the regional commander . . . are subject to Israeli
labor law . . . In other words, the drawing of administrative powers based on
intemational law does not detach the authority from the sovereign that erected it.
Application of the Legal Right to Equality at Work.
181. Courts have expressly suggested, in the context of a tort case, that Israeli law should apply
to the relations between an Israeli employer and a Palestinian employee in the settlements because it
is directed at the employers. CC (Jer.) 1632/96 Alsuf v. Ariel Metal and Another, 1| 6 (2002), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr).
182. James Mathieu, The Supreme Court's Not So Clear Statement in Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 21 BROOKLYN J. iNT'L L. 939 (1996); Todd
Keithley, Does the National Labor Relations Act Extend to Americans Who are Temporarily
Abroad?. 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2135, 2144 (2005).
183. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f), (h) (1976); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l(a), (c)(2) (1964) {but cf EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991) (offering a narrow interpretation)); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(4),
12112(c)(2)(B) (1994). These U.S. anti-discrimination laws reach outside the U.S., but only to the
limited extent that they reach U.S. citizens working for U.S.-controlled employers. See Paul
Secunda, "The Longest Journey. With A First Step": Bringing Coherence to Sovereignty and
Jurisdictional Issues in Global Employee Benefits Law, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 107 (2008).
184. See Employment Relations Act, 1999, c. 26 § 32 (U.K.); Equal Opportunities
(Employment Legislation) (Territorial Limits) Regulations, 1999, S.I. 3163 (U.K.) (entitling those
working outside Great Britain to equal freatment); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c. 65, § 10 (U.K.)
(providing that employment is regarded as part of a British establishment if (a) the employee does
his work at least partly in Great Britain; or (b) the employee does his work wholly outside Great
Britain but the employer has a place of business in Great Britain, work is carried out for that
establishment, and the employee is ordinarily a resident in Great Britain). The Posted Workers
Directive motivated Britain to guarantee more rights to workers employed abroad. See Thomas
Linden, Employment Protection for Workers Working Abroad. 35 INDUS. L. J. 186 at 187 (2000).
185. See Kiryat Arba Adm., HCJ 663/78, 33(2) PD.
186. UborA 45/42-3 Efron v. Ariel, 17 Ubor Judgments 209 (1986), Nevo Legal Database (by
subseription) (Isr.).
187. Kiryat Arba Adm., HCJ 663/78, 33(2) PD at 403-04.
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The military commander does not hover in air, detached from the source that
launched him to battle and then to administration, but rather continues to absorb
fi^ om it his stattis in the region.
The advantages and limits of applying minimum standards extraterritorially
should be stated. On the one hand, the exfraterritorial application of protective
labor law is not subject to the contact analysis, thus avoiding the perceived
ambiguity and subjectivity inherent in such a multifaceted criterion. This
ambiguity is demonstrated in the opposing conclusions of the HCJ and NLC. In
addition, exfraterritorial application of protective labor law preempts
manipulation of the contact count, as in the case of an Israeli employer enlisting
a Palestinian intermediary so as to avoid the application of Israeli law. On the
other hand, since exterritorial application of law is an exceptional measure, the
question arises as to how wide the interpretation of exfraterritorially applicable
labor law should be.'^^ One indication that there might be hierarchy in labor
rights, which would support a narrow exfraterritorial application, is the
Intemational Labor Organization (ILO) 1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.'^^ The Declaration purports to reflect standards
applicable to all states, regardless of individual conventional undertakings. It
lists four "core labor standards,"'^" paving the way for arguments that rights
outside the core standards, such as the right to limits on working hours,
reasonable rest periods or to a safe and healthy workplace, let alone collective
rights and rights originating from collective agreements, hold a more limited
normative value'^' and therefore would not be regarded as applicable
extraterritorially.
188. The intemational human rights obligations of a state in the area of labor law apply outside
its sovereign territory, including in territory under occupation. Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 163,1|
112 (July 9); Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 7 & 8, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 1093 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1|
138 (2011). The discharge of such obligations, however, cannot be carried out through
extraterritorial extension of domestic legislation.
189. Intemational Labor Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and Annex, art. 2, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233.
190. The four core labor standards are: freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; the
effective abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation. Id.
191. Philip Alston, 'Core Labor Standards' and the Transformation of International Labour
Law, 15 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 457, 486 (2004). But cf Brian Langille, Core Labor Rights—The True
Story, 16 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 409, 428 (2005); Guy Mundlak, Changing Welfare Regimes, in THE
WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte
eds., 2004). The differentiation between rights (or principles) under the Declaration has been
criticized both in principle, as a significant departure from the insistence within the intemational
human rights regime on the indivisibility and equality of all rights, and on its merits, since the core
itself is "not necessarily based on any coherent or compelling economic, philosophical or legal
criteria, but rather reflects a pragmatic selection of what would be acceptable at the time." Alston,
.supra note 191, at 459, 485.
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To conclude, the courts could have applied Israeli law to the employment
of the Palestinian employees as a matter of enforcing non-derogable minimum
rights. This route would have been grounded in law, but might have been of
limited value: first, because the range of minimum rights is too ambiguous, and
second, because the application of these rights could be undermined with
relative ease by changing the employment structure from a direct to a triangular
form of employment. Of particular interest is whether the court could have
included the right to equality among employees with respect to terms and
conditions of work, itself a core right under Israeli labor law. Instead, the HCJ
opted to rely directly on the principle of equality. The following section
discusses the role of this principle in the NLC and HCJ's rulings and in
addressing the employment of Palestinians in the Israeli settlements more
generally.
B. Equality
The fundamental difference between the NLC s approach in Givat Ze'ev
and the HCJ's reasoning in Worker's Hotline is the significance that they
attached to equality as a rationale in choice of law issues. Before addressing
each of their positions, it is useful to inquire whether we value equality, and if
so, what kind of equality. In the context of labor relations and employment,
arguably the priority should be the guarantee of minimum standards, such as a
decent living wage, respect at work, and a proper work/life balance, rather than
equality. Joseph Raz is probably the best-known expounder of the idea that
equality has no intrinsic value, although "some equalities are sometimes
instrumentally valuable, as they are useftal for securing some valuable
outcome."'^^ When discussing distributional goods designed to forestall hunger,
Raz argues that "[w]hat matters is that the factor which made the distribution
good or valuable was not that it was equal, but rather that it avoided hunger."'^-'
It is interesting that Raz chose hunger as an example for the irrelevance of
equality considerations. As Amartya Sen's analysis of the Great Bengal famine
of 1944 reveals, (lack of) equality may determine whether or not particular
groups have access to particular goods in the free market. According to Sen, the
Great Bengal famine was caused not by a shortage of food, but by a sudden drop
in purchasing power following stratification of incomes among Bengalis."'^
Inequality in the distribution of an instrumental good affected the ability of
people to satisfy their need for an end-use good, a need which itself is fixed,
independent of how much of that good anyone else has. "^Another lesson that
192. Joseph Raz, On the Value of Distributional Equality 3 (Oxford Legal Studies Research
Papers, Paper No. 4, 2008).
193. W. at 4-5.
194. See Amartya Sen, Starvation and Exchange Entitlements: a General Approach and its
Application to the Great Bengal Famine, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. ECO. 33, 55-56 (1977).
195. Robert Goodin, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC POLICY, 244-265 (1995).
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can be gleaned from Sen's analysis is that the notion and relevance of equality
carmot be considered in abstracto. Instead, equality must be assessed in light of
its interrelation with other objectives of legal regulation of the relevant sphere.
In doing so, we must not only ask 'equality amongst whom' (Israelis and
Palestinians? employers and employees?) but, even more imporiantly in our
case, 'equality of what?''^^
The NLC clearly distinguished between prohibited discrimination in terms
and conditions and justifiable distinction in the applicable law. The NLC
continued that, while discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race or
nationality is patently prohibited, "there may be special circumstances that
justify this reality."'^^ It concluded that the couris of lower instance should
decide such factual matters.
The HCJ confused two very different objects of equality: equality of law
and equality of conditions. Thus, Justice Rivlin mentioned that the contact count
may be affected by the "principle of equality—equal pay and condition for equal
work, or work of equal worth."'^^ He was referring to equality in individuals'
terms and conditions of employment. However, the judgment concludes by
mling that the petition is accepted, in the sense that Israeli law should apply
equally to Israelis and Palestinians. Similarly, Justice Jubran quoted Ariicle 1 of
the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, which
describes discrimination in "opporiunity or treatment in employment or
occupation" as including discriminatory "access to . . . employment and to
pariicular occupations, and terms and conditions of employment." ^ ^^ However,
Justice Jubran immediately clarified that the issue at hand is the distinction
between Israeli and Palestinian employees with respect to the lav./ that govems
the employment relationship. '^^ '^  The following subsection focuses on the matter
that was seen by both couris to be central: whether Israelis and Palestinians
should both be subject to Israeli law. It also offers a critique of the right of
Palestinians to enjoy not only equal laws, but also equality in terms and
conditions of employment. This is an important issue that neither the NLC nor
the HCJ addressed.
196. Amartya Sen, Equality Of What?, Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Stanford University
(May 22, 1979).
197. Givat Ze 'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 43.
198. Workers ' Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 21
199. Intemational Ubor Organization, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention, art. I (a), 3, July 5, 1958,1.L.O. No. 111, 362 U.N.T.S. 31.
200. Workers' Hotline, HCJ 5666/03at 1| 4 (Jubran, J., concurring). In a recent case. Masad v.
Kibbutz Galgal, the Jerusalem District Ubor Court explained that "the HCJ in Givat Ze'ev
emphasized the importance of applying equal taw to workers that are not dissimilar in any relevant
fashion and that are carrying out equal work or work of equal worth." Ubor Ct. (Jer) 1729/10 Masad
V. Kibbutz Galgal, % 26 (Aug. 11, 2011) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription! (Isr.) (emphasis
added).
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/. Equality of Law - Applicable Systems of Law
a. The Role of Equality in Choice of Labor Law
The HCJ assumed that the resolution of a labor dispute should be guided by
the principle of equality in the applicable system of law between Palestinians
and Israelis employed by the same employer in the settlements. The court
expressed this ideal by noting that in the unlikely situation in which there are no
"concrete" contacts, the court may have recourse to objective ones, such as the
law applicable to similar contracts, in similar circumstances, between similar
parties. "' The HCJ explained that its conclusion on the contact count realized
the principle of equality. ^ ''^
The significance of equality as a principle in private intemational law
jurisprudence should not be overstated. Fundamentally, the entire choice of law
doctrine is based on the notion of different laws applicable to different people in
different places.^*'^  Mark Gergen makes a blunt case for "the irrelevance of
equalify" in such matters, stating "unequal freatment of people is unavoidable in
the conflict of law."-*''' In a manner that seems quite pertinent to the issue at
hand, he argues that "[a]rguments about inequalify in the conflict of laws ofren
collapse back into the author's preference for a territorial or personal order."^"^
Indeed, neither the text of the Rome Convention nor its authoritative
interpretation mentions equalify. The explanatory preamble to the Rome I
Regulation, which incorporates the Rome Convention into the law of the
European Union, provides that, in determining the law most closely connected
to a contract, "account should be taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in
question has a very close relationship with another confract or confracts."^^^
Yet, rather than equality among confracts per se, this provision seems to aim at
ensuring uniformity in goveming law where such is required to guarantee the
effectiveness of contracts. In practice, under the European approach and the
presumption that labor contracts are govemed by the law of the territory in
which the work is performed, similar contracts are likely to be govemed by the
same law. On the other hand, under the system prevalent in some areas of the
US, largely similar situations may be treated differently in terms of governing
201. Workers ' Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 1| 18.
202. W. at II 21.
203. In fact, in Israel different personal laws apply to Israeli citizens in the areas of marriage
and divorce. This is even considered a liberal and multicultural approach (at least as far as the Arab
minority is concemed). See Miehael M. Karayanni, Choice of Law Under Occupation: How Israeli
Law Came to Serve Palestinian Plaintiffs, 5 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 1, 40-41 (2009).
204. Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 902 (1998).
See also Wengler, supra note 95, at 822-23, 858.
205. Gergen, supra note 204, at 903.
206. Rome 1 Regulation 593/2008 1| 20 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC).
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The different rulings of the NLC and of the HCJ are, in part, a result of the
different perspective taken by the courts on the significance of equal freatment
of people. The HCJ attached importance to the like treatment of like people,
stating that Palestinians working in the settlements should be treated as
Palestinians working in Israel.^"* The NLC saw no fault in the fact that, in
principle, different people are employed under different laws. It relied, inter
alia, on its own jurisprudence that distinguished between Israeli nationals
serving in an embassy abroad and local employees of the same embassy, and
between an Israeli policeman serving in the West Bank and a local
policeman.^ "^^ In both cases, the Israeli nationals benefited from the terms of
Israeli law, which dovetails with the power stmcture in the area, while local
employees benefited only from the terms of local law.^ '*^
It is true that the NLC's approach is more in line with private intemational
law principles, under which the application of different law to different
individuals is not, in and of itself, discriminatory.^" And yet, the NLC's
judgment is not free from difficulty in its juxtaposition of private intemational
law jurisprudence, which is founded on the neufral precept of respecting equality
of states, at times at the expense of equality of people, with a situation that is
anything but neutral. Gergen, for example, rejected the infroduetion of equality
considerations into choice of law deliberations, instead arguing forcefrilly for
territorial choice of law rules based on a territorial nexus, which he hails for
their neufrality.- '^^  The legitimacy of choice of law rules depends on the laws
not advantaging or disadvantaging any group in a predictable way. Territorial
mies satisfy this requirement since "[e]veryone has a roughly equal chance of
losing or winning under a territorial approach."^'^ However, in the case of
Palestinians employed by Israelis in the settlements, the neutrality of the
territorial approach in this case fails on two grounds. First, Israel confrols the
law of both territories. Second, within the territory of the West Bank, the law
applies on a personal basis that is anything but neufral. To the confrary, the NLC
has set the choice of law rules in a manner that denies Palestinian, but not
207. See e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E. 2d 394 (1969); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E. 2d 454
(1972). But see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E. 2d 454 (1972) (Bergan, J. dissenting) (rejecting any
distinction between plaintiffs on the basis of their residence—granted, equality between workers
might be more significant than between torts plaintiffs).
208. Workers ' Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 \ 26.
209. Givat Ze ev. Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at \ 38.
210. LaborA 48/4-7 Abu Tir v. Israeli Police, 21 Labor Judgments 28 (1989) Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
211. See Wengler, supra note 95, at 854-55; Givat Ze'ev, Labor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at HH 620-
21.
212. Gergen, supra note 204, at 918-19.
213. /J. at 919. See also Wengler, supra note 95, at 830.
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Israeli, employees the benefits of Israeli law.^''' When the territorial law is
skewed in favor of one kind of employee, and does not guarantee an equal
chance, it presents a strong case for the application of the principle of equality to
mitigate the harm caused by reference to territorial law.^ ' ^
It is not surprising that both the HCJ and the NLC avoided the politically
loaded questions related to the status of the settlements and of Israeli law
applicable to them, but rather took the existing situation as a baseline. And yet,
this avoidance means ignoring the wider reality of Israeli and Palestinian
economic existence in the West Bank.
b. Self-determination and the Law of Occupation as
Constraints on Equality in Law
One of the arguments put before the HCJ as to why it should refrain from
subordinating the contracts of Palestinians to Israeli labor law was that choice of
law ml ings should not serve as a backdoor for achieving what the Israeli
parliament and executive (through the military commander) would not: a blanket
application of Israeli law to the settlements.^'^ The court replied that a choice of
law ruling applying Israeli law to a contract made in the West Bank, or to which
a resident of the West Bank is party, does not affect that sovereign status of the
West Bank.^'^ While generally true, this principle does not mean that choice of
law rules do not have any implications for the intemational legal order. Indeed,
the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws lists "needs of the interstate and
intemational system" first among the factors that a court should examine in any
policy analysis,^'^ indicating that such implications are not only possible but
214. See Aeyal Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor's New Clothes of
the International Law of Occupation?, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (2007).
215. Mundlak, supra note 11, at 216; Wengler, supra note 95, at 825.
216. Brief of the Attomey General, supra note 32, at^l 9.
217. Id. at II 12. Ironically, the authority quoted by the Court has nothing to do with choice of
law mies, and in fact establishes the opposite of the Court's assertion. The Court quoted the Abu
Salah case, which concemed the extension of Israel's "law, adjudication and administration" to the
Golan Heights in the Golan Heights Law. Golan Heights Law, 5741-1981, 36 LSI 7 (Isr.). In that
case the HCJ said that the extraterritorial application of an Israeli norm to an area outside Israel's
territory does not, under Israeli law, automatically render that area part of Israel. With the benefit of
thirty years' hindsight, there are few who would argue that this was precisely the intended effect of
the Golan Heights Law, and that the Abu Salah ruling was a less than successful attempt to avoid
acknowledging that Israel had purported to annex the Golan. The Attomey General's supplementary
brief in Givat Ze'ev provides: ". . . the regions of Judea, Samaria and Gaza are not part of the State
of Israel, since it was not declared that 'the law, adjudication and administration of the State' would
apply in them." Brief of the Attomey General, supra note 32, at 1| II. This is an acknowledgement
that the State regards the Golan Heights Law (1981), which contains such a declaration, as annexing
the Golan Heights to Israel. On the Status of the Golan Heights, see Leon Sheleff, Application of
Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is Not Annexation, 20 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 333 (1994) and Asher
Maoz, Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights is Annexation, 20 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 355
(1994).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §6(2)(a) (1971). This factor has been
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should be taken into account.
The engagement of states with choice of law rules is a refiection of comity
and reciprocity as guiding principles of the international legal order.^'^ These
principles provide a strong basis for applying territoriality, rather than equality,
as a fundamental theory of choice of law rules. More specifically, in the context
of labor law, territoriality is actually a means of advancing equality between
employees.^^" Yet, in terms of the law applicable in the occupied territories,
Israeli courts have not given much deference to the needs and interests of other
sovereigns. This attitude was not based on an appreciation of the dispute over
the sovereignty of the West Bank and Gaza Sfrip. Rather, unlike ordinary
situations involving choice of law questions, in the occupied territories no other
state entity enforces local law. Kaplan v. Gabay, for example, concerned a tort
action between Israeli parties with respect to a boating accident that had taken
place in the Sinai, which was at the time under Israeli occupation. ^ ^' The then-
existing Israeli law required the plaintiff to show a cause of action under both
Israeli law and the lex loci delicti, namely Egyptian law. The Israeli district
court ruled that the requirement to show a claim under Egyptian law could be
exceptionally dismissed, because the area was "under foreign sovereignty only
de jure, but under Israeli control in practice."^^^ Since no Egyptian parties were
involved, the disregard for Egyptian law was uncontroversial. In KPA Steel, the
court applied the same rationale to justify an expansive interpretation of Israeli
legislation so that it applied extraterritorially in the West Bank. In court noted
that application of Israeli law in occupied territory "does not infringe in practice
on the sovereignty of any other state."^^-' Arguably, if the consfraint of
respecting a foreign sovereign is removed, greater weight can be attached to the
principle of equality among employees through the application of the same
system of law.
At first glance, the Court's reasoning runs diametrically counter to the
premise of the law of occupation, which, we argue, is that any legal act by the
labeled "largely irrelevant," and "silly." Shasta Livestock Auction Yard Inc. v. Evans Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 1027,1033 (1974); W. A. Reepy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mish-mash,
34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 663 (1983). No case has ever turned on it. Lea Brilmayer, Jack Goldsmith,
and Erin O'Hara O'Connor, CONFLICT OF LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 239 (6th ed. 2011).
However, it has been suggested as a means of introducing public order considerations, such as
refraining from applying the law of a country if it falls below the level of law of civilized nations.
Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the Increased Use of Interstate and International Policies in
Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases under the Second Restatement and Leflar's Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465, 2484 (1996). As pointed out above, under the
U.S. approach, such considerations figure in the determination of the law most closely connected to
the contract rather than as a break on its application, as they do under the European System.
219. Eugene F. Scoles et al.. CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-20 (4th ed. 2004).
220. Mundlak, .yupra note 11, at 211.
221. Misc. requests (TA) 151/80 Kaplan v. Gabai, 1982(2) PM 290 [1982] (lsr.)
222. Id. at 298 (following Chaplin v. Boys, (1969) (A.C.) 1085 All E.R. at 2 (Eng.)).
223. KPA Steel, CrimA 123/83 at 1| 8.
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occupant infringes upon the interests of the ousted sovereign, and therefore,
must be limited to the absolutely necessary minimum. If in 1983 couris could
maintain that sovereignty in the West Bank was not vested in any pariicular
body, they would be hard pressed to repeat such a decision today; it is widely
agreed that it is not sovereignty as such that ought to be preserved, but the
ability to exercise the right to self-determination. Accordingly, the interests of
the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Sfrip, whose right to self-
determination Israel has recognized in 1978, and again in 1993, carmot be
entirely ignored.^^'' The situation is nonetheless complicated by the fact that no
state claims sovereignty in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Thus, although pre-
1967 Jordanian law is applicable territorial law, it is a hollow representation of
sovereignty. A choice of law rule that would respect the modem form of
sovereignty, namely the right to self-determination of the Palestinians, requires
taking account of Palestinian labor law. However, the legislative powers of the
Palestinians under the Interim Agreement^^^ do not extend to the settlements.
Consequently, the courts are correct in their asseriion that there is little that
stands in the way of applying Israeli law to the exclusion of other laws.
Iris Kanor argues that by a variety of choice of law tactics, Israeli couris no
longer regard the occupied territories as held in tmst. Instead, they assist in the
gradual incorporation of these territories under Israeli govemance.^^^ This, she
asseris, is in line with a trend identified over twenty years ago by Amnon
Rubinstein and Michael Shalev, who posited that the gradual erasure of the legal
separation between Israel and the territories amounts to a "creeping
annexation,"^^^ such that speaking of the area as outside Israel becomes
disingenuous.^^^ Michael Karayanni's study on Israel's personal jurisdiction^^^
complements this insight in regards to the personal jurisdiction of the couris.
Karayanni demonsfrates that Israeli jurisdiction was extended to the West Bank
in order to serve the Isi-aeli settlers, as pari of establishing total confrol over the
West Bank. This extension had the inadverient effect of bringing under the
jurisdiction of Israeli couris not only Israeli settlers, but also Palestinians. When
the Palestinian population of the West Bank became a burden on the couris, a
personal jtirisdiction doctrine evolved to exclude disputes in which both pariies
224. Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 I.L.M. 1466, sect. A(c) (1978);
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Govemment Arrangements preamble, Sept. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1525.
225. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, .swpra note 22 at Annex III, Appendix 1, art. 21(1).
226. Iris Kanor, Israel and the Territories: the Interplay between Private International Law and
Public International Law, 8 MiSHPAT UMIMSHAL 551, 599 (2005) (in Hebrew).
227. Michael Shalev, LABOUR AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ISRAEL 58 (1992).
228. Kanor, supra note 226, at 599 (citing Rubinstein, supra note 113, at 440).
229. Michael Karayanni, The Quest For Creative Jurisdiction: The Evolution of Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine of Israeli Courts toward the Palestinian Territories, 29 MICHIGAN J. lNT'L L.
666 (2008).
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were Palestinian from the Israeli couris.^ ^*^ Worker's Hotline demonstrates that
insofar as territorial control of the settlements' areas is concemed, the Israeli
grasp continues. The Court's ruling was based not on a pure choice of law claim,
but also on the application of Israeli law through the unariiculated basis of an
expectation imputed to the pariies. What both the Israeli legislature and military
failed to achieve, the Couri ultimately accomplished: it extended the application
of Israeli labor law to the territory of settlements, with the exception of consent-
based instances where all of the employees are Palestinians. Admirable as it may
be for this law to apply uniformly to all employees in the occupied territories,
this judicial activism is in contravention of the law of occupation, which
prohibits the territorial extension of the occupant's law to the occupied territory,
regardless of the domestic doctrine that leads to such an outcome.
One could also point out that it was the Palestinian employees who argued
for, and who benefit from, the application of Israeli law rather than Jordanian
law.^ ^ ' This argument, however, does not exempt the Couri from its obligation
to act in accordance with Israel's intemational legal obligations. These
obligations may include taking account of the implications of the right to self-
determination of the Palestinian people, even if they run counter to the personal
interests of the individuals before the couri. Individuals may confract out of their
self-determination interest, and had there been an express stipulation in
employment contracts that Israeli law should govem, the Couri might have been
correct to give effect to such a stipulation. However, when determining the
principles goveming its choice of applicable law, the Couri should not disregard
intemational legal principles, even if they do not a priori tip the balance one
way or the other.^^^ On balance, despite the fact that the petitioners were
Palestinians, the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people should
probably not have guided the Couri to a different conclusion than the one it
reached. Unforiunately, the failure of the Couri to appreciate the significance of
the territorial law applicable to the settlements as a factor in a weighted contacts
count is disturbing. Of course, one cannot disregard the fact that, given Israel's
extensive confrol over the West Bank (which in many ways amounts to defacto
annexation) an argument that the Couri should refrain from applying Israeli
labor law—lest it would tindermine Palestinian self-determination or enfrench
the de facto annexation—might appear somewhat hypocritical.
In conclusion, as the NLC has stated, equality is not ordinarily a guiding
principle in choice of law in labor disputes. However, equalify may have a
remedial role when the neutralify of law, which underlies the common rule that a
contract be govemed by the law of the territory where the work is performed, is
undermined. At the same time, the HCJ's approach of demanding equalify in
terms of the applicable legal system does not provide the necessary safeguards
230. Id. at 680; Rubinstein, supra note 113, at 449-50.
231. For more on this dilemma, .see Karayanni, supra note 203; Sfard, supra note 18, at 169.
232. Gross, supra note 214, at 7; Karayanni, supra note 203, at 29.
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against employee exploitation because it disregards the political context in
which the employment relationship takes place, namely the fundamental
inequality inherent in a situation of occupation. While this inequality is a factor
that a court would find difficult to take into account when resolving a specific
dispute, it is an important one to consider when analyzing the situation from a
detached perspective. An altemative, and in our opinion preferable, type of
equality could have been invoked: equality in the terms and conditions of work.
This type of equality is explored in the following subsection.
/•/. Equality of Conditions
As noted earlier, the plaintiffs did not demand, and the courts did not
address, the more ambitious goal: equality of the terms and conditions of work
between Israeli and Palestinian employees. This gap between the right to equal
treatment and the right to minimum conditions through core rights plagues the
treatment of various weak employee groups. In regard to contract employees, for
example, one can identify an agenda advocating equal treatment in relation to
fuUtime employees, alongside much more modest calls for joint employer-
subcontractor responsibility for minimum standards.^-'^ This gap is far from
trivial. At least in the present context, it is surprising as a matter of both policy
and law that the courts permitted it to persist. As a matter of policy, as noted
above, the differences between Israeli and Jordanian core rights, although not
completely inconsequential, are relatively minor.^-'^  The same catinot be said of
the differences between core rights, Jordanian or even Israeli, and those rights
that some Israeli employees in the West Bank enjoy in practice. Therefore, a
discourse that is limited to core rights obfuscates the disparity in working
conditions between Palestinians and Israelis that would be evident if equality,
rather than minimum conditions, was pursued. Legally, it is difficult to
understand how the general application of Israeli labor law does not include the
right to equal terms and conditions, given that equality is explicitly guaranteed
in Israeli legislation and in collective agreements. The following sections
develop this argument.
a. Exterritorial Application of the Legal Right to Equality at Work
Like most developed nations, Israeli labor law includes statutes that
explicitly prohibit discrimination on a variety of grounds including sex, race,
nationality and ethnicity.^^^ Ordinarily, such legislation only applies
233. See. e.g.. Fudge, supra note 90, at 302, 306; Deakin, supra note 90, at 75, 77.
234. See supra text adjacent to note 25. In a dissenting opinion. Justice Cohen even added: "and
if one were to claim that the [Palestinian] population in the occupied territories are entitled to enjoy
the same arrangements and public life that the state grants its citizens in its territories, . . . I would
answer him that, to our great shame, we in Israel are still far from the . . . arrangements that the
Jordanian is trying to regulate." Almakdassa, HCJ 337/71 at 585 (Cohen, J. dissenting).
235. See. e.g.. Equal Rights for Women Law, 5711-1951 (Isr.); Equal Retirement Age for Male
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territorially. Both in the US and in Europe, courts have traditionally rejected the
extraterritorial applicability of a constitutional right to equality.^^^ However,
whether under the influence of intemational human rights law,^^^ or other
mechanisms of pressure,^^^ the notion of such exfraterritorial applicability is
gaining ground.
However, at least with regard to labor law, there are suggestions that this
position should be revisited. The House of Lords stated that "Employment is a
complex and sui generis relationship, confractual in origin but, once created,
having elements of status and capable of having consecutive or simultaneous
points of contact with different jurisdictions. So the question of territorial scope
is not straightforward."^•'^Specifically, Guy Mundlak argues that the unique
nature of labor law demands "[l]ooking for the substantive economic
beneficiary" in the employment relationship, and "determining the applicable
law [as] a matter of matching the appropriate legal system with the identification
of economic reliance (or subordination)."^'"' Mundlak suggests that this
argument was the rationale underlying the HCJ's Workers' //orö«e judgment:
"Israel (state, employers, economy, and public) benefits from the activities of
the Israeli employers in the territories, despite the fact that these territories are
not part of Israel itself "^^' And he concludes: "Labor law is generally applied
and Female Workers 5747-1987 (Isr.); Equality of Opportunity in Work Law, 5748-1988 (Isr.);
Equal Rights for People with Disabilities Uw 5758-1998 (Isr.).
236. For the US see Gould, supra note 11, at 502 (and references there). A certain exception is
the European Directive 96/71 EC conceming the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services, which guarantees a "posted" worker—who is sent from a home state to work
temporarily in a "host state"—the right to enjoy the core labor rights (minimum wage, working time
and paid holidays, health and safety, discrimination law, pregnancy and maternity protection; in the
constmction industry workers are also entitled to rights stemming from collective agreements which
have been declared universally applicable—see Sec. 3(1) of the Directive) of the host's labor law.
Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996, on the Posting of
Workers in the Framework of the Provisions of Services, 1996 O.J. (LI 8) 1 (EC). Beyond those core
rights, employers are not obligated to offer more favorable working conditions, identical to those
applicable to their own workers (although there is nothing to stop the employer from doing so). For a
discussion of the Directive, .see Paul Davies, The Posted Workers Directive and the EC Treaty, 31
INDUS. L. J. 298, 303 (2002). However, the E.C.J. case of Laval is viewed as significantly limiting
the impact of the directive. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnad
sarbetarefbrbundet, 2007 E.C.R. 1-11767. More importantly, the analogy between the cases is only
partial, at best: in the "posted workers" scenario—the worker is sent by her employer from her home
country to a host country; in the case under analysis here, it is the home country which extends the
application of its laws to its citizens.
237. With respect to the UK, see jurispmdence on the extraterritorial applicability of the Human
Rights Act, drawing on the extraterritorial application of intemational human rights obligations (e.g.,
Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [153] (appeal
taken from Eng.)).
238. On the extraterritorial application of U.S. constitutional law, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008).
239. Serco v. Lawson [2006] UKHL 3,1| 6.
240. Mundlak, supra note 11 at 205.
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2012] OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS 625
equally to all the workers in the territory who are affected by the nature of the
labor market within which thé state intervenes. . . If the application of labor law
within the territory is merited by considerations of equality, then stopping at the
state's border is intrinsically unequal."^^^
During the 1991 war in Iraq, in preparation for a chemical attack, the Israeli
Ministry of Defense decided to distribute gas masks to citizens in Israel and to
settlers residing in the occupied territories but not to Palestinians. The HCJ,
however, ordered the ministry to issue gas masks to Palestinians living in the
occupied territories. The HCJ stated, without citing any specific source, that "the
military commander must treat individuals in the region equally, and must not
discriminate between them."^''^
And yet, in the context of labor law, the courts have only partially provided
labor rights to Palestinians under the principle of equality. Israel's Equal
Opportunities in Employment Law (1988) ("Equal Opportunity Law"), which
applies not only to public employers but also to private employers of over five
persons, was not mentioned at all by the NLC. It was mentioned only once, in
passing, by the HCJ in Workers ' Hotline. In the context of the NLCs ruling, this
exclusion is no surprise. Since the NLC ruled that Palestinians working in the
occupied territories are not entitled to rights under Israeli labor law, its working
paradigm required no referral to the Equal Opportunity Law. 2'''' The refusal of
the HCJ to rely on the Equal Opportunity Law, however, is curious. The HCJ's
ruling would seem to call for extending the full scope of Israeli labor law to the
employment relationship between an Israeli establishment and a Palestinian
employee. This would include the relevant statutes mandating non-
discrimination. Moreover, even on a narrower reading of the judgment, if Israeli
labor law as a whole does not extend to the West Bank, at a minimum, core
protective clauses must be extended.^^^And since Israeli courts have repeatedly
noted the jus cogens character of principles of non-discrimination in
employment,^''^ these principles should be considered as falling within the core
rights that apply directly to Palestinians.
242. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
243. HCJ 168/91 Miladi Morcus v. Minister of Defense 45(1) PD 467, 470 [1991] (lsr.)
(author's translation).
244. As noted, the NLC distinguishes the few cases that reached a different conclusion as based
on the employer being a public entity. The rationale, therefore, is that the Israeli state and its organs
are bound by Israeli law wherever they operate. Naturally, this rationale falls short of a wholesale
application of Israeli (labor) law.
245. See supra Section A. Protective Legislation: Minimum Conditions.
246. See, e.g., HCJ 6845/00 Eitana Neve v. Nat'l Ubor Ct. 56(6) PD 663 1| 50 [2002] (lsr.) (a
female employee's "agreement" to waive her right to equal conditions for early retirement is void).
See also discussion adjacent to note 2529 infra.
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b. Equality under international human rights obligations
The notion of extraterritorial application of rights where the state exercises
control is entrenched in intemational human rights law. While constitutional law
may extend only territorially, the intemational human rights obligations of states
extend wherever they exercise effective control.^''^ This extension includes, first
and foremost, areas under occupation. With respect to Israel and the West Bank,
this obligation has been stated expressly by the Intemational Cotiri of Justice in
an advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Constmction of the Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, '^*^ as well as by several human rights freaty
bodies.^''^ Thus, to the extent that equality in work is an intemational human
rights norm, Israel is bound to guarantee this norm within the West Bank. The
Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Israel
is pariy, recognizes the right of remuneration. The right of remuneration
provides all employees with fair wages and equal compensation for work of
equal value^ *^^  without distinction of any kind. Under the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (to which Israel has been pariy since
1966), states underiake to guarantee the right of any individual, without
qualifications regarding national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law,
notably in the enjoyment of ceriain rights including: the right to protection
against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, and to just and favorable
remuneration. The state is also obligated to provide effective protection and
remedies against any acts of racial discrimination, as well as a fomm to seek
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such
discrimination.^^' This enables state institutions to prosecute discrimination by
private employers. At the same time, a distinction may be called for between
states' obligation to respect rights, which extend extraterritorially, and their
obligation to ensure the same rights. The latter obligation entails a greater
intervention in private relations, constituting a greater burden on the state, which
may be less appropriate for exfraterritorial extension. In Workers ' Hotline, the
247. Human Rights Comm., Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No.
R.12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), 176 (1981); Human Rights Comm., Montero v.
Uruguay, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/I06/1981 (Mar. 31, 1983); Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 1093
Eur. Ct. H.R. II 138 (2011).
248. Legal Consequenees of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 163,1| 109, 134-36 (July 9).
249. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations, 1| 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/1SR
(Aug. 21, 2003); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding
Comments, Israel, H 23, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/3 (July 22, 2005); Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Comments, Israel, 1| 23, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/lSR/CO/3 (July 22, 2005).
250. ICESCR, supra note 188, art. 7.
251. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Raeial Discrimination, art. 6, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, Dec. 21, 1965.
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present case, this would imply distinguishing between the municipality of Givat
Ze'ev, which is a state authority, and other, private employers.
c. The right to equality'under collective agreements
It is somewhat puzzling that the NLC and the HCJ did not conduct a
serious inquiry into the possibility of applying collective agreements to
Palestinian employees. The NLC addressed the matter in an almost dismissive
fashion, dedicating only the last paragraph of a fifry-page judgment to the
analysis of this issue. The couri stated, without elaborating, that "unless an
explicit provision exists in the collective agreement to suggest its application on
employees who reside in the West Bank but are not Israeli citizens—an 'Israeli'
collective agreement will not apply to a resident of the region."^^^ Arguably,
however, the opposite should serve as the default position. More specifically, if
no explicit provision exists, the collective agreement should apply to all
employees in the firm, regardless of their national origin. Even more
dumbfounding is the fact that the HCJ did not discuss the issue at all.
Otto Kahn-Freund has noted that individual labor law is easier than
collective labor law to apply across national borders.^^^ Perhaps this
discrepancy explains—but does not excuse—the reluctance of the couris to
delve into the latter. Within the Etu-opean context, for example, the Posted
Workers Directive recognizes, albeit to a limited extent, the applicability of
collective agreements across borders.^^'' Since at least one of the employers
before the couri (Givat Ze'ev, a municipal council) is bound by a collective
agreement, it seems periinent to address the true range of rights held by the
Palestinian employees of that employer. The absence of any such discussion has
concrete implications for two reasons. First, the rights guaranteed by collective
agreements are more generous than those guaranteed by protective labor law.
Second, since collective agreements are voluntarily signed by the pariies, and
are not the result of extraterritorial extension of laws, the application of such
agreements is a significantly less politically charged matter than the application
of Israeli laws. If the HCJ had concluded that the collective agreements were
binding, this admission would have made the analysis regarding the
exfraterritorial applieation of protective labor law redundant.
The courts' reluctance to consider this avenue reaffirms Arthurs'
conclusion that "[u]nions . . . have not been particularly successfiil as agents of
extraterritorialify." ^-^ Addressing the matter through the prism of collective
252. See Givat Ze'ev, Ubor Ct. (BS) 3000050/98 at 1| 46. Interestingly, in the early 1970s, the
Civil Administration included a clause in its contracts of employment with Palestinian residents of
East Jerusalem, diseussed in Makdadi, supra note 1799.
253. Otto Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MODERN L. REV. 1,21
(1974).
254. See supra note 236.
255. Arthurs, supra note 149, at 548.
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agreements would have permitted the courts to promote justice, by preventing
Palestinian employees' discriminatory exclusion from protection under labor
law, while avoiding prejudice in terms of collective interests through
generalized statements incompatible with the laws of occupation.
d. Expectations, Equality and the Juxtaposition of Power
Disparities
The HCJ's insight regarding the Palestinian employees' expectations is
noteworthy. The Court notes "an expectation that certain employees would not
be deprived of rights, compared with colleagues performing the same work, on
the ground that different laws apply to these and to those."^^^ The Court simply
assumed that employees expect similar laws to apply to Israeli and Palestinian
employees. At least as plausible, however, is the supposition that employees
expect similar terms and conditions to apply. A possible counterargument is that
plaintiffs did not even raise this demand, which suggests that they had no
expectation of receiving equal terms and conditions as their Israeli co-
workers.^^ ^
The problem in relying on the expectations of employees is that these
develop within a social and economic background that is rarely egalitarian, and
expectations often reflect an acceptance of unequal treatment. For this reason,
courts have looked beyond the actual expectations of individual employees as
reflected in their bargaining positions. For example, US and UK courts have
mied that the fact that an employer's bargaining power is greater with respect to
women than with respect to men is not a sufficiently justifiable reason for wage
disparities.^^^ Lower rates for women cannot be justified "simply because the
market will bear it."^^^ The same docfrine was also adopted by the Israeli NLC,
which ruled that even if a female employee demanded significantly lower pay
than a male employee, it does not justify different wages under the Equal Pay
for Male and Female Employees Law.^^"
In excluding certain extrinsic economic factors from justifiable
consideration so as to prevent the Equal Pay Law from becoming a 'dead letter,'
the courts follow the path drawn by Kahn-Freund, who noted that "[t]he main
object of labour law has been, and we venture to say will always be, to be a
256. Worker's Hotline, HCJ 5666/03 at 1| 25.
257. For a reservation on the relevance of expectations in determining the law applicable to the
contract and the inconsistency of Israeli case law, see Schuz, supra note 63, at 399-401.
258. See. e.g.. Hodgson v. Brookhaven, 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970). For the UK, see
Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd. v. Fletcher, [1979] 1 All E.R. 474 (A.C.) (UK). See also Paul
Schofield, A Material Factor: Defences to Claim for Equal Pay, 47 MODERN L. REV. 740, 742
(1984).
259. Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973); Coming Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,205(1974).
260. LaborA 1156/04 Orit Goren v. Home Center, 1| 13 (2007), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
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countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is
inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship."^^'
But while the docfrine seems relatively clear, it is still necessary to identify
legitimate and legal expectations in negotiations. This matter is especially
important if we are to assess the expectation, noted above, of Israeli employers
to pay Palestinian employees lower wages, which is in a way the raison d'être
for their employment. The English Employment Tribunal noted that for
differentiated pay between men and women to be legitimate it must be
"reasonably necessary in order to obtain some result {other than cheap female
labor) which the employer desires for economic or other reasons."^^^ Such a
reason must not only be a material factor, but also one that "right thinking
people would think o f . . . as a sound and tolerable basis."^^^ If this dictum is
accepted when the supply of cheap (female) labor is not attributable to any
specific actor, it should be all the more so when factors well beyond 'neutral'
economic forces create disparities in bargaining power, as in the case of Israeli
and Palestinian employees.
If this conclusion is frue in a domestic context, it seems to be sfrengthened
in a global one, where forces and institutions are much less discemible.^^'*
Indeed, the disparity in bargaining power between Israelis and Palestinians is not
an ordinary case of cliques and social milieus. The Palestinian employees are
residents of territory under occupation, and belong to a community that is
legally regarded as inimical to that of the employer. The Israeli employees are
nationals of the occupying power, and compatriots of the employer.
Consequently, in addition to being handicapped as employees bargaining with
employers, Palestinians are disadvantaged in bargaining with Israelis as a result
of a situation which is formally recognized and legally regulated through the law
of occupation—a law which generally protects residents of the occupied
territory from the occupant. But the law of occupation, discussion of which is
noticeably absent from both the NLC's and HCJ's judgments, does not directly
address negotiations over terms of employment: under the law of occupation,
civilian nationals of the occupant are not expected to live side by side with
nationals of the occupied continually for any extended period of time.
The weakness of the Palestinian employees in negotiating with Israeli
employers is directly linked to the dependence of the Palestinian economy on
the Israeli market, which the 1995 Interim Agreement has not diminished. This
dependence is the result of Israeli policies, which have had a formidable impact
on the development, or rather lack thereof, of the Palestinian economy and labor
sector. Within the occupied territories, Israel took steps to limit the viability of
261. DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 85, at 18.
262. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (No. 2) [1981] I.R.L.R. 388, at 394 (emphasis added).
263. Ojutiko V. M.S.C. [1982] I.R.L.R. 418, 421 (cited in STEPHAN HARDY, LABOUR LAW IN
GREAT BRITAIN 214 (2011 )).
264. Arthurs, supra note 149, at 537 (emphasis added).
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Palestinian agriculture and indusfry, while employing Palestinian employees in
the construction of settlements and their connecting roads. These policies can
only be sketched here briefly. First, Israel has not only refrained from investing
its own funds in the civil infrasfructure needed for the economic development of
the occupied territories, but has also prevented others from doing so.^^^ Second,
Israel regulated the economy within the occupied territories in a manner
unfamiliar to Western democracies. For example, only a week after the 1967
war ended, on June 18, 1967, Israel issued a military order in the territories that
made it illegal to conduct business transactions involving land or property,^^^ to
conduct electricity work or connect a generator, to plant new citrus trees, or to
replace old nonproductive trees without a permit.^^' Second, Israel initiated
"New Deal" or "public works" schemes, ostensibly to prevent despair and avoid
social upheaval, but also to advance security projects, such as the building of
settlements.^^^ Indeed, one might surmise that Israel intentionally obstructed the
development of independent Palestinian industry so as to restrict the
development of a potential economic competitor,^^^ and in order to guarantee a
regular supply of cheap labor.^'" As already noted,^" this assessment is less
conspiratorial than it may seem at first sight.
Israel's policy of "anti-planning"^'^ and "de-development"^'-' has led
Palestinians to rely on Israel for their livelihood, resulting in the integration of
the Palestinian economy into the Israeli economy. Thus, in the first two decades
following the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, the Palestinian
workforce has increasingly relied on work in Israel. During that period,
Palestinians working in Israel received wages that were significantly lower than
those of Israelis in comparable work, and in many cases were segregated into
distinct low paying sectors.^''' This disparity was achieved, /«ier alia, through
the exclusion of Palestinians from the highly dominant Israeli trade union, the
Histadrut, thus significantly facilitating the confinement of non-citizen workers
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to the secondary
Following the two intifadas, and the ensuing drop in the number of permits
granted to Palestinians for entry into Israel, their reliance on the Israeli economy
changed in character. The reliance went from an inter-territorial (Israel-occupied
territories), to an intra-territorial (occupied territories) dependence. According to
the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, in 2010, 14.2% of the Palestinian labor
force, including both employed and unemployed individuals in the West Bank,
were regularly employed in settlements and in indusfrial zones.^^^ To appreciate
this figure, two additional factors should be considered. First, agriculture is
probably the most labor-intensive sector in the West Bank and is seasonal in
character. For example, 5,000 Palestinians are employed by Israelis in the
Jordan valley on a permanent basis, but in the date harvest season, their numbers
climb to 20,000, in that area and that sector alone. ^ ^^  These workers are not
accounted for in the figure cited. Second, of those within the labor force, 23.6%
are unemployed, a rate among the highest in the world.^^^ Accordingly, among
those Palestinians in actual employment, the rate of those employed by Israelis
is much higher, reaching close to 20%. Despite reporis of a thriving Palestinian
economy, this trend is not changing. In fact, a recent United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) briefing on the Palestinian labor market concluded,
somewhat strikingly, that "[t]otal West Bank employment [in 2008] increased
by 4,400, but all net growth occurred in Israel and Israeli settlements."^^^
Although this Ariicle deals primarily with the legal state of affairs, the
economic and political dependence leads to exploitation that is even more severe
than the legal analysis may indicate. Thus, although it is unambiguously clear
that Palestinians working in settlements and in indusfrial zones are formally
entitled to minimum wage, reporis by NGOs,^ ^*^ in the press,^^' and in a UN
briefing paper^^^ suggest that the reality of Palestinians actually receiving such
wages is the exception, rather than the norm.
Palestinians have become even more dependent on the settlements for their
livelihood as a result of the resfrictions on movement within the West Bank
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since the early 2000s. Israel has imposed permanent and temporary checkpoints,
physical obstmctions, the Separation Barrier, forbidden roads, roads with
restrictions on Palestinian use, and the movement-permit regime.^ -^^  These
restrictions, "unprecedented in the history of the occupation"^*^ in their scope,
duration and severity, have dismantled Palestinian sources of livelihood, led to
soaring unemployment and poveriy rates, and, consequently, have had a clear
impact on the abilify of Palestinians to maintain a significant bargaining position
vis-à-vis potential or current employers. Many Palestinians cannot maintain their
own businesses, since movement of goods has become expensive and even close
to impossible; tourism has become non-existent; employees cannot commute
and are forced to seek work close to home.^^^ The outcome resembles a
phenomenon that in recent years has been the target of criticism by scholars of
fransnational labor, namely the ability of corporations to move beyond national
boundaries, while taking advantage of local employees' immobility.^^^ Global
corporations and their local suppliers are depicted as agents of exploitation,
taking advantage of developing countries' low wages and weak social and
environmental regulations to produce low-cost goods at the expense of local
employees' welfare.^^^
Another aspect of the juxtaposition of power disparities between
Palestinian employees and Israeli employers lies in the fact that Palestinians
who wish to work for Israelis in the settlements must receive a three-month
renewable permit from the Israeli Civil Administration. The permit is given to
the employer on behalf of the worker for whom the permit is issued. Permits
allow workers to pass checkpoints and to enter indusfrial zones. The immediate
consequence is a severe inhibition on the Palestinian employees' freedom of
contract. Their decision to leave a pariicular employer, for example, results in an
immediate annulment of their permits to work in the settlement altogether and
thus constitutes an obvious threat to their livelihoods. Evidence gathered by
Workers' Hotline reveals that Israeli employers use work permits as a means of
extoriion against workers who demand their salary, minimum wage, vacation
pay, pay slips, or improvements in health and safefy conditions.^^^ The permit
regime was declared illegal by the Israeli Supreme Couri, insofar as it periains to
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foreign (migrant) employees.-^^^ The Court mied that the "binding agreement"
policy deprives a party who is already the weaker side of the labor relations of
economic bargaining power,^^^ and that it "creates a form of modem
slavery."^^' The employee's basic freedom—to end an employment
relationship—is impeded, and extensive documents reveal the widespread
exploitation of Palestinians working for Israelis. However, as noted, an
equivalent policy still holds for Palestinian employees in the settlements and in
Israel.292
Finally, the political power of settlers over the Israeli political process,
including the ability to secure decisions that may have direct and indirect
consequences on economic relations between settlers and Palestinians, has been
well documented.^^^ Needless to say, the power of Palestinian employees does
not even come close.
Regrettably, the courts completely ignored these unique circumstances. In
rejecting the nexus of the contracts to Israeli law, the NLC stated that the
employment relationship is a "local relationship for performance of employment
in the region, and the only international element is the identity of the employer,
i.e. his being Israeli."^'^'^ Yet the fact that the employer holds the nationality of
the occupying power is an 'intemational element' that should bear on the
analysis. Even when the NLC addressed the 'unique reality in the region,' it was
content to state that the close connection between the two labor markets justifies
limiting the disparities between the two systems. The Court suggested that
Israeli law should apply only if Jordanian law demonstrates an "extremely
unreasonable" deviation from the standards of the law of Israel and other
"culturally developed nations."^^^ This standard for comparison is appropriate
in conflicts between the laws of sovereign, culturally similar societies. However,
it seems less appropriate in a case of complete domination by one state and its
population over another population that is politically and culturally distinct.
Instead, the court could have employed extra caution to create disincentives for
additional exploitation, in a manner similar to the legislative approach regarding
employment of foreign employees. Moreover, as has been reiterated throughout
this Article, limiting 'the disparities between the two systems' is of less interest.
When addressing exploitation, the courts should have focused on limiting, if not
eliminating, the disparities between work terms and conditions for employees.
Furthermore, the NLC acknowledged that, while there may be gaps in work
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conditions between Israelis and Palestinians, such gaps may be justified due to
particular 'circumstances.' As mentioned, it sent the cases back to the district
labor courts to determine the applicable rights on their merits case by case. Its
comment may be interpreted in two different manners. First, it might be an
implicit effort to justify inferior terms and conditions of employment through
reference to the lower cost of living of the Palestinian employees. Strikingly,
this reasoning also appeared in the Attorney General's brief.^'^ The idea that the
background standard of living is a relevant consideration to the detriment of the
plaintiff is a dangerous one. To give a trivial example, it would suggest that
employees who live with their parents and whose accommodation expenses are
completely covered are not entitled to minimum wage. In addition, such
reasoning undermines the role that equality plays, in the broader sense, in social,
economic and legal relationships. It means that the law has an authoritative role,
not in reducing inequalities and tempering their consequences, but in refiecting
and preserving the status quo and even exacerbating the implications. From a
labor law perspective, such a sfrategy suggests a change in the delicate balance
between the 'status' that shields the employees and the commercial ties that
envelop them (the contract).^^' Labor law jurispmdence increasingly views
background information (nationality of persons involved, marital status, political
affiliation, etc.) as irrelevant to the determination of employment rights. The
cost of living may be a legitimate ground for preferential treatment if an
employer wishes to provide incentives to employees to reside in a more costly
location, where the standard terms of employment are insufficient. However,
this scenario is distinct from the one considered here on two counts. First, this
Article is concemed not with incentives, but with equality with respect to
minimum conditions. Second, preferential treatment would be permissible where
the employer has a legitimate interest in employees residing in a costly location,
and if all employees can choose to benefit from the incentive. Not only can
Israeli employers not be said to have an interest in their employees residing
within the settlements, but, more importantly, given that the Palestinian
employees do not have that choice, they may not be denied the corresponding
benefits.
A different way of understanding the NLC's dictum is to suggest that the
Palestinians are bound by different responsibilities (national insurance, taxes,
etc.), and therefore are entitled to different rights. This is also a problematic path
to follow. Beyond the general argument against a blanket conditioning of rights
on responsibilities, it is logically flawed in labor relations. For while the relevant
employee's rights should be realized by their employers, the employees'
responsibilities are owed to the govemment. The rights A has against B cannot
be dependent upon the duties that A owes to C.
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V.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the reasoning of the Israeli National Labor Court and
High Court of Justice in determining the law applicable to the employment of
Palestinians in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Both courts applied
choice of law rules, but reached opposite conclusions because of a different
weighing of the contacts. Of particular interest is the HCJ's conclusion, based on
the contact count, that Israeli law should apply. This conclusion sits well with
the principle of equality as a fundamental principle of labor law.
We argue that the reference to equality is far from straightforward. In
particular, we focus on the choice of the HCJ to consider equality of laws, rather
than equality in terms and conditions of employment. This choice resulted in the
Court's failure to guarantee the rights of the Palestinian employees both in the
short term and in the long term. We also have reservations as to the recourse to
equality, whether in the applicable law or even in terms and conditions of work,
as a guide in a situation of extreme power disparities. We suggest that a blanket
invocation of the term, without considering its wider implications when applied
in occupied territory, may conflict with the long-term interests of the population
concerned, helping to create a myth of a benign occupation in a context where
rights are routinely denied.^^^
The courts' choice to disregard the contents of the employment agreements
and to limit themselves to questions of the applicable law is both regrettable and
confusing. It is regrettable because remaining within the parameters of
contractual relationships, namely examining whether there are serious reasons to
distinguish the contractual entitlements of Palestinian from those of Israeli
employees, regardless of the law that applies territorially, might have allowed
the court to avoid the pitfalls related to the law of occupation. It is confusing
because despite the centrality of equality in the HCJ's reasoning, equality in
employment terms was not, in effect, the axis of the deliberations. Instead,
Worker's Hotline focused on equality in the applicable law.
To be sure, we do not object to the reference to equality. Rather, we argue
that the Court should have taken into account the effect of different courses of
action on the right of employees to equality. If the Court had referred to equality
in terms and conditions rather than to equality in the applicable law, its
judgment would have carried greater benefits for Palestinians as a weak
employee population.
The analysis above should assist in responding to two central objections to
the focus on equality. One possible objection is that the principle of equality
guarantees beneficial terms and conditions to Palestinians only when they work
298. KRETZMER, supra note 105, at 198; Gross, supra note 214, at 8; Sfard, supra note 18, at
166.
636 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:2
for Israelis, and not when they work for Palestinians.^^^ This may increase the
dependence of Palestinian labor on Israeli capital. However, it cannot be ignored
that the recourse to equality is meant to mitigate a pariicular type of exploitation
that only applies when Israelis employ Palestinians. The alignment of Israeli
employees (against whose rights the Couri examines the rights of Palestinians)
characterizes the many cases involving the Israeli govemment as an employer
(via the Civil Administration or municipal councils) and as a holder of military
and legal power (through the military commander), as well as cases involving
Israeli private businesses. Such an aligrunent demands a judicial safeguarding of
the rights of those who are in danger of severe economic exploitation, who are
politically disenfranchised, and who, unlike citizens, are unable to converi their
political capital to economic gains.-''''' Needless to say, this scenario does not
take place in the parallel situation, that of Palestinians being employed by
Palestinians, and therefore does not require a similar measure.
Lastly, one could argue that equating the terms and conditions of
Palestinian labor with those of Israeli employees might undermine the incentive
for Israeli business to operate in the occupied territories. As a result, the
livelihood of the Palestinians would be put at a detriment. In other words, if
Israeli businesses operating in the occupied territories are denied the economic
advantages they were accustomed to, they may opt to retum to Israel or to move
elsewhere in search of cheaper labor. This, of course, is a common argument
that fuels the notorious 'race to the bottom.' It is not only morally suspect (being
an effective 'allow me to offer you sub-standard conditions or I'll leave'), it has
also been proven to be overinflated: businesses (especially those owned by
settlers who reside in the occupied territories, and those that rely on the
territories' natural resources) do not relocate with such ease. Israeli govemment
employers operating in the occupied territories ceriainly cannot relocate.
Furihermore, the relocation of Israeli businesses back to Israel would not
necessarily be to the detriment of Palestinians. In effect, this dynamic may
counteract the crawling annexation. If Israeli businesses relocate from the
occupied territories, the economic vacuum may well be filled by Palestinian
businesses, thereby benefiting the Palestinian economy directly.
The critique in this Ariicle is offered in full appreciation of the genuine
attempt by the couris to impose a rule of law in the face of an anomalous
situation. It has been asked in the past whether the attempt to offer legal redress
in an anomalous situation should be abandoned altogether, as it perpetuates the
anomaly. We do not necessarily ascribe to this position. Indeed, the laws of
armed conflict, on which the entire situation rests, signify the abandonment of
the 'progress through catastrophe' approach, suggesting that progress requires
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rule of law. At the same time, the shaping ofthat law must not be carried out in
the absfract. While the courts should steer away from high politics, they must
take cognizance of politics in their deliberations. Where political forces affect
their rulings, they must be realistic about the prospective consequences of such
mlings. This is essential if they are to offer redress in either the immediate or
long term.
The focus of this Article is on the law goveming the employment
relationship between Israeli employers and Palestinian employees in industries
operating in the West Bank. The length of the Israeli occupation, and the social
and economic entanglement that derives from it, have consequences for a wide
variefy of relationships, including employment relationships, and we hope that
our analysis may shed some light on the concrete legal, political and social
implications. Despite the idiosyncrasies of the Israeli-Palestinian situation,
parallels may already be drawn to other, perhaps less severe and certainly less
lengthy, situations. American and European companies have been operating in
Iraq and Afghanistan, taking advantage of the needs of the military operating
there along with its significant de facto control of decisions being made. Not
enough attention is directed to the terms and conditions of local workers
employed by these corporations, and perhaps it would be judicious to pay such
attention sooner rather than later.
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